



Diplomatic Brief

Subject: Turmus Ayya and Its Faithful Sons:

Imad Daboob, Mashal Alkook and the Palestinian-American Arena

**Support for Terrorism and Propagation of the
Settler Violence Narrative**

Iyar 5786/May 2026

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Background and Context

- Turmus Ayya - an Arab village in Area B (civil control of the Palestinian Authority with overarching Israeli security responsibility) serves as a hub for disseminating the “settler violence” narrative to international audiences, particularly in the United States. As a whole, the village of Turmus Ayya makes no secret of its direct, intensive affiliation with Fatah, and with “the armed resistance.” The outgoing mayor of Turmus Ayya, Lafi Shalabi, was elected while serving time in an Israeli prison for involvement in a terrorist attack - another indication of the value placed on violence and anti-Israel terrorism by the residents of the village.¹
- Turmus Ayya’s unique demography and concentrated diaspora community are the engines behind intensive political activity in the United States. This activity is organized and coordinated—not incidental—and is carried out in close coordination with leadership in Ramallah. Activists from Turmus Ayya in the U.S., primary among them Imad Daboob and Mashal Alkook, operate as representatives of the Palestinian Authority, Fatah and Samidoun, leveraging community and political networks in the U.S. - in possible violation of FARA requirements.
- Despite holding an official role in Fatah, Daboob’s messaging—circulated through policy and opinion-shaping circles in the U.S.—is often received as “neutral” reporting from a “peace-seeking diaspora figure,” although open-source information presents a markedly different profile.
- While Alkook’s systematic use of civil and digital platforms in the U.S. to influence political discourse and public opinion against Israel may be protected speech, his glorification of violence and terrorism, support for internationally sanctioned terrorists and jihad are of a different order of speech - as is his public branding of President Trump as an “infidel.” To Muslim ears, this is a very specific and active call to action that may be considered incitement to violence.

¹ See *Accomplice in deadly May shooting sentenced to 10 months*, Times of Israel 24 November 2021.

Implications for US Policy

The unique anomaly of a small village comprised almost entirely of US passport holders - located in one of the most complicated conflict zones in the world - has been exploited by a network of pro-Palestinian NGOs. Leveraging Biden-era policy, they have created and activated a legislative tripwire that has the potential to force the hand of the US government, to limit the range of available foreign policy options available to the State Department and the Executive, and to create messaging threats that will harm the President's position in public opinion. This mechanism has been fully formalized and institutionalized on the US side and has already been activated no less than 4 times. Left unchanged, it is not a question of IF the situation will escalate again, only of when, and how much damage it will do.

Turmus Ayya: Hotbed of conflict

April 8th 2026

Wildly divergent accounts of violence in and around the village of Turmus Ayya², a Palestinian Authority-controlled village in the Binyamin region of Judea, shine a spotlight on many of the issues surrounding the “settler violence narrative.” Since many residents of Turmus Ayya also hold US citizenship, incidents there often receive outsized attention in American media, making inaccurate or one-sided reporting not just more problematic, but more consequential.

The latest episode is a case in point: both Israeli and international outlets misreported a stone-throwing incident on April 8th 2026 on Route 60, just outside Turmus Ayya.

Initial coverage described Israeli hilltop youths stoning cars on the highway in an act of settler violence.³ The facts tell a different story:

On Monday, April 8th Turmus Ayya dedicated a park in memory of Amar Rabee, a 14 -year old US citizen killed by IDF forces while carrying out a terrorist attack on Israeli motorists one year earlier.⁴ Ahead of the April 2026 memorial and dedication ceremony, the Turmus Ayya village council requested IDF protection, expressing concern that “violent settlers” might try to disrupt the proceedings. The IDF complied. According to Arabic-language reports, the US Embassy was also notified in advance.

At the same time, residents of the neighboring Israeli communities warned the IDF that Turmus Ayya’s social media channels were actively promoting the event and calling on participants to carry out stone-throwing attacks afterward. Despite these warnings, the event proceeded as planned - as did the violence.⁵ Israeli vehicles were pelted with stones on Route 60

² See, for example, [What It's Like in the Palestinian Town Attacked by Israeli Settlers](#), *Time Magazine*, versus “Dozens of Hamas terrorists arrested in Binyamin region,” *Israel National News*; [The West Bank village of Palestine's forgotten Americans](#), *Le Monde* versus [IDF rescues civilian who was attacked in West Bank’s Turmus Ayya](#); *Times of Israel*.

³ See Ariel Kahane on X.

⁴ See Appendix II below.

⁵ The IDF Spokesperson released screenshots of the calls to join the violence and to erase CCTV

immediately after the ceremony ended. Arabic digital media channels later circulated reports that “occupation forces have flooded the village” and called upon residents of Turmus Ayya to disable security cameras and erase footage to help the attackers evade the IDF dragnet.⁶

Despite the advance intel, the real-time IDF presence, documented incitement, public calls to obstruct justice, an official IDF investigation, and arrest of the perpetrators, prominent journalists misreported the event, attributing the stone-throwing to Israeli hilltop youths and bemoaning settler violence. By the time retractions or corrections trickled in, they were too little, too late: the story of “settler violence against the peaceful village of Turmus Ayya on their day of mourning” had already taken hold.

Many aspects of this disturbing incident - including the events that led up to it and its repercussions - cannot be understood or placed in their proper context without a more in-depth discussion of the village of Turmus Ayya, its unique demography, and the political framework that makes this small village particularly important on the global stage.

One year earlier...

On April 8, 2025, Amer Rabee, a 14-year-old boy, was shot and killed by Israeli soldiers near Turmus Ayya village in the West Bank. He was a United States citizen. He had been born in Saddle River, New Jersey in 2011, taken to the “West Bank” when he was approximately two years old, and had lived there for the remaining twelve years of his life. His death triggered a mandatory Department of Justice consideration under 18 U.S.C. §1119, constituent-service responses from multiple members of Congress, and the “Americans killed abroad” media framing that the US political system cannot treat as a foreign policy matter. Although Rabee was not a journalist, a diplomat, a businessperson, or any of the other categories of American whose death abroad the US government has traditionally treated as a foreign policy obligation, his death was, in a structural sense, a high-value political event.

Rabee was a teenager who had spent his entire conscious life outside of

footage: <https://t.me/realelchangr/4905?single>

⁶ <https://t.me/omarabualqutain/57655>

the United States; he was, in every meaningful sense, a “West Bank Palestinian” who happened to hold a US passport - but the US political system has no mechanism for that distinction. His passport generated the same mandatory institutional responses as would the death of any American abroad. The media framed it as “an American killed by Israeli soldiers.” Congresspeople from New Jersey and Illinois – where his extended family is concentrated – received constituent inquiries and wrote letters. The Department of Justice was obligated to consider whether 18 U.S.C. §1119, the foreign murder of a US national statute, applied. Each of these responses is the system working exactly as designed.

That framing is not callous; it is analytical, and the key to understanding the bigger picture.

1. Turmus Ayya holds the highest documented concentration of US citizens in any non-sovereign, non-territory location in the world. Approximately 80-90 percent of its 3,000 permanent winter residents hold US citizenship or permanent residency. No comparable case has been documented globally.
2. This concentration was not strategically engineered. It is the product of four decades of chain migration under the 1965 Immigration Act, birthright citizenship for children born in the US and taken back to the West Bank, and legal citizenship transmission to children born in the West Bank to US citizen parents. The mechanism is ordinary; the cumulative result is extraordinary.
3. An organized advocacy network – anchored by the US Palestinian Council, the Palestinian American Community Center, and American Muslims for Palestine – channels incidents involving Turmus Ayya residents into the US political system through documented congressional engagement, media amplification, and legal challenge strategies. This network operates within legal norms. Its anchor institutions, however, have documented organizational connections to Muslim Brotherhood-linked infrastructure. This is the point of connection to the Turmus Ayya diaspora, and the two members of that diaspora who are most active and influential in the US arena: Imad Daboob and Mashal Alkook.
4. The network in which the Turmus Ayya diaspora operates in the US - and in which it holds outsized influence - has produced documented changes to US foreign policy. The NSM-20 national security memorandum (February 2024), the formal triggering of the Israel Leahy Vetting Forum, and the suspension of Netzah Yehuda battalion assistance are direct policy outputs attributable to this pressure chain. These outcomes were not produced by foreign lobbying. They were produced by the mandatory institutional responses that are set in

motion when US citizens are involved in incidents abroad. These responses should be reconsidered in light of the fact that Turmus Ayya is by no means a unique phenomenon; it's uniqueness is a question of scale.

Faithful Sons of Turmus Ayya

I. Imad Daboob

Turmus Ayya is often portrayed as a moderate community seeking coexistence that is repeatedly attacked by violent settlers from nearby Israeli communities. Even a cursory exploration of public sources of information reveals a more complicated reality.

Despite their American citizenship and fantastically privileged standard of living, the villagers of Turmus Ayya make no secret of their support for Fatah and for anti-Israel terrorism; the commemoration ceremony for the “martyr” that was the backdrop for the incident detailed above was a small, subdued expression of the general atmosphere in the village.

Imad Daboob, a native of Turmus Ayya and a U.S. resident, served time in Israeli prison for acts of terrorism, apparently committed in the context of the First Intifada; he continues to take pride in this part of his resume’.⁷ Today, Daboob is a prominent and senior activist in the Palestinian-American arena, publicly and consistently identified with Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Palestinian Authority. His activity combines glorification of violence, promotion of anti-Israel narratives in the American arena, and ongoing direct ties with the leadership of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Daboob’s public statements consistently accuse Israel of “apartheid” and “genocide,” deliberate starvation of Palestinians and other forms of abuse of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Community events and digital content in which he is involved include material praising violent “resistance” and “martyrs,” support for antisemitic content, backing for BDS, alongside political advocacy targeting U.S. lawmakers and organizations.


Key Findings

Glorification of Violence and Terror

- Documentation of Daboob’s sponsorship, planning and participation in events featuring songs praising Fatah and infamous terror attacks, including the National Water Carrier attack, marked as a symbolic founding event of Fatah:

⁷ <https://bit.ly/3PfSAez>

At a recent “Sahra Henna Night” an event organized by Daboob in Memphis, Tennessee to celebrate “rich cultural traditions,” guests danced to songs that called for submachine guns to “decorate the hills” and others glorifying attacks carried out by fedayeen fighters, including references to the 1965 Eilabun Tunnel attack, widely regarded as the founding operation of Fatah, an internationally sanctioned terrorist organization responsible for the murder of countless Israelis.



The date of the Eilabun attack, 1/1/1965, is celebrated annually as Revolution Day by Fatah supporters - in Memphis, in Turmus Ayya, and throughout the areas under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction.



Some of the lyrics to the song to which Daboob is seen dancing and singing: *“O mother, the fighters (fedayeen) carried out an attack in the Eilabun tunnel (National Water Carrier), I swear, my brother.”*


https://www.tiktok.com/@amz_productions/video/7622912878722501919

Additional songs to which the celebrants danced included these lyrics: *“O machine gun 500, O machine gun 500, adorn the hilltops for me.”*

https://www.tiktok.com/@amz_productions/video/7622959244073078047

https://www.tiktok.com/@amz_productions/video/7622542380654267679

- Daboob's personal accounts on Facebook and TikTok document repeated dissemination of content glorifying “martyrs,” convicted terrorists imprisoned in Israel, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. One post, celebrating Fatah’s 59th anniversary, was particularly effusive in its poetic idolization of terrorists. The video attached to the post included footage of gunfire, Dalal Mughrabi, masked militants and rocket fire directed at Israel.



Organizational Roles and Affiliations with Sanctioned Entities

The US Palestinian Council

On various official platforms, at events and in press releases, Daboob is repeatedly presented as holding an official role in “Fatah - US Region” (including Deputy/Acting Secretary)⁸. Daboob is identified as a board member and senior activist in the US Palestinian Council, a Fatah arm, as well as other Palestinian-American bodies.

Fatah's Own Documentation of the USPC Relationship

Daboob and the USPC network operate as representatives of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Independent Arabic-language research found that Fatah itself has confirmed this relationship – not through inference, but in its own published materials.

1. Fatah's Media Branch Announced USPC's Founding

When USPC was established in April 2018, the announcement was published by Fatah Movement Media – Lebanon Branch (إعلام حركة فتح – لبنان), treating the founding as a Fatah organizational development.⁹ The PLO's Washington representative at the time, Husam Zomlot, gave a speech at the founding conference. Fatah's official spokesperson, Osama al-Qawasmi (a Fatah Revolutionary Council member), later spoke at a USPC political seminar in Chicago.¹⁰ These are not circumstantial associations; they are Fatah's own endorsements of USPC at the leadership level.

2. Fatah's Own Strategic Document Names the US Diaspora as Its Top Priority

Fatah's own statement: In 2023, the PLO Palestinian National Council Chairman stated publicly – through WAFA, the PA's official news agency – that the US diaspora represents “the single highest-leverage international strategy – their influence exceeds other efforts undertaken.”¹¹ This is not an outside assessment of the network's

⁸ See, for example, televised interviews on official Fatah channels:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvr8fyX5bSs>

⁹ “إنطلاق المجلس الفلسطيني الأمريكي” [Launch of the US Palestinian Council], Fatah Movement Media – Lebanon Branch (إعلام حركة فتح – لبنان), [falestinona.com](https://www.falestinona.com), April 23, 2018.

<https://www.falestinona.com>

¹⁰ Palestinian Electronic Archive (pead.ps), documentation of Fatah spokesperson Osama al-Qawasmi appearance at USPC political seminar, Chicago (c. 2017-18). Corroborated by Wattan News coverage. <https://www.pead.ps>

¹¹ PLO Palestinian National Council Chairman statement, WAFA (Palestinian News Agency),

significance. It is Fatah's own strategic doctrine, in writing, naming the United States as its primary international pressure point.

3. The Documented Abbas-to-USPC Connection

In September 2023, USPC President Basem Hishmeh met directly with President Abbas on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.¹² This is documented in multiple sources and establishes a direct line between Fatah's senior leadership and the organization through which Daboob operates.

- <https://uspalestiniancouncil.org/board>
- <https://www.facebook.com/USPalestinianCouncil>



OUR BOARD

- Shukri Taha, *President*
- Samiah Bahhur, *Vice President*
- Shukri Makhoul, *Treasurer*
- George Habeeb, *Secretary*
- Fuad Ateyeh
- Imad Daboob
- Prof. John Dabeet
- Dr. Hanna Hannania
- Khaleda Laymon
- Hayel Mansour


2023. Original Arabic: "تأثيرهم يتجاوز ما يُبذل من جهود أخرى." Archive search: wafa.ps.

<https://www.wafa.ps>

¹² Wafa, September 22, 2022, readout of Abbas meeting with Palestinian community leaders, New York (UNGA margins). Hishmeh attendance confirmed via InfluenceWatch and USPC board records.

<https://www.wafa.ps> | <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/us-palestinian-council-uspc/>

Selected USPC Activities:



- 2.8.2025 - Thanking U.S. Senators for efforts to block arms sales to Israel;
- December 2024 - Call to “stop genocide” and end “occupation”:
- 2.12.2023 - Action alert calling to stop “genocide” in Gaza:
- Cooperation with the American Muslim Taskforce ahead of U.S. elections: “We continue intensive campaigns and meetings to shape candidates’ positions, especially on the Palestinian issue.”
- Collaboration with the Palestinian American Community Center and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) on BDS activity, boycotts of Israel, contract cancellations, and economic sanctions.

Daboob's Ties to Palestinian Leadership Indicate the Level and Significance of the USPC-Fatah Relationship

- Documented meetings with:
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)



Hussein al-Sheikh, Vice President of the PLO and Deputy Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority



أبو سليمان أحمد دعبوب

6 August 2025 · 🌐

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8/6/2025

تشرفت اليوم صباحا بلقاء سيادة نائب رئيس دولة فلسطين الاخ حسين الشيخ " ابو جهاد " في مكتبه بمدينة رام الله . يحضر الاخوين الدكتور حنا حنايا . عضو المجلس المركزي والمجلس الفلسطيني الأمريكي uspc ، والاخ عماد قراقره المتحدث الرسمي باسم الشؤون المدنية .



Tawfiq Tirawi, former head of Palestinian Authority Intelligence Services



Mohammad Shtayyeh, former Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority



أبو سليمان أحمد دعبوب
5 August 2022 · 🌐

...

دوله رئيس الوزراء
الدكتور محمد اشتية
عضو اللجنة المركزية لحركة فتح
كان لقاءا مميزا بحضور الاحبه والاصدقاء
كل الاحترام والتقدير



Jibril Rajoub, President of the Palestine Football Association (PFA) and Senior Fatah official



Shahin Farsin, Foreign Minister of Palestine



أبو سليمان عماد دعيوب
20 August 2025 · 🌐

...

تشرفنا اليوم بزياره معالي وزيره الخارجيه الدكتوراه فارسين شاهين في مكتبها في وزاره الخارجيه
في رام الله بحضور الاخوه شريف ملوح وابو يعقوب



Abbas Zaki, Secretary of PLO Executive Committee and Fatah leader



أبو سليمان عماد دعيوب
3 May 2025 · 🌐

...

اللجنه التنفيذيه تنتخب الاخ عزام الأحمد امين سر اللجنه التنفيذيه لمنظمه
التحرير الفلسطينيه مبارك اخانا ابو نداء



Moayyed Shaaban, Minister of Resistance to Settlements and the Wall



- Sami Abu Shehadeh, MK (Balad Party), Ekrima Sabri and Archbishop Hana Attallah (both arrested for incitement) and other senior Palestine Liberation Organization figures.

ابو سليمان عماد دعبوب
18 March 2021 · 🌐

دعوة عامه يوم الجمعة الموافق 4/2
نرحب بجاليتنا الفلسطينية والعربية والاسلاميه لاحياء ذكرى يوم الارض
بمشاركه ١٤ مؤسسه فاعله ..سيتمثل المهرجان الكثير من الفقرات وخاصة التراثيه
See less



- Participation in an online conference in honor of Land Day, as an official representative at international conferences alongside Fatah and Palestinian Authority leadership (Latin America, Europe)



- September 2023 - Organized a rally supporting Mahmoud Abbas following international criticism over antisemitic remarks and conspiracy theories



Two Additional Institutional Actors with which Daboob Maintains Close Ties

Two other organizations in this network carry greater current legal risk and deserve equal attention:

Palestinian American Community Center (PACC) – Active Legal Exposure

PACC's governance ties USPC and Memphis directly together: Diab Mustafa (PACC NJ Board President) served on the USPC national board 2018-2020.¹³ Hayel Mansour serves simultaneously as PACC Memphis President and as a current member of the USPC national board¹⁴ – the same board on which Daboob sits.

On April 6, 2025, Rep. Gottheimer formally referred PACC to the Department of Justice for investigation under the federal material support for terrorism statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339B).¹⁵ This is an active referral. DOJ has not publicly responded.

PACC operates centers in Clifton, New Jersey and Memphis, Tennessee. In 2025 it took three actions that have attracted federal legal attention:

- Hosted a convicted PFLP member as a speaker. PACC's April 2025 annual conference featured Wisam Rafeedie – convicted in an Israeli court in 1991 for PFLP membership – speaking virtually.¹⁶ When press coverage emerged, PACC deleted his name and photo from its website but kept his session listed. Rep. Rashida Tlaib appeared at the same conference.
- Distributed materials from a US-designated terrorist-support organization. Samidoun was jointly designated by the US and

¹³ US Palestinian Council, historical board records (2018-2020). InfluenceWatch USPC profile. <https://uspalestiniancouncil.org/board> | <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/us-palestinian-council-uspc/>

¹⁴ US Palestinian Council, current Board of Directors; PACC Memphis organizational records (Mansour identified as president). <https://uspalestiniancouncil.org/board> | <https://www.paccusa.org>

¹⁵ Rep. Josh Gottheimer (NJ-5), letter to Attorney General of the United States requesting DOJ investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (material support for terrorism), April 6, 2025. <https://gottheimer.house.gov>

¹⁶ JNS, Jewish Insider, Jerusalem Post, Algemeiner (multiple reports, April 2025): Wisam Rafeedie at PACC 7th Annual Conference; NGO Monitor: Rafeedie background. Rep. Gottheimer DOJ referral letter, April 6, 2025. <https://www.jns.org> | <https://www.ngomonitor.org> | <https://gottheimer.house.gov>

- Canada in October 2024.¹⁷ Samidoun promotional materials were distributed at PACC's 2025 conference – after the designation.¹⁸
- Produced and deleted a video disputing October 7 Hamas atrocities. PACC produced and later removed a video denying documented Hamas actions from October 7, including deaths at the music festival and sexual violence.¹⁹ A tweet stating "Resistance is always justified when people are occupied" was also subsequently deleted.

American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) – Under Legal Scrutiny **AMP is the financial backbone of the wider network. It funds PACC-NJ.**²⁰

AMP's annual revenues grew from \$790,000 in 2017 to \$2.26 million in 2023. It runs the largest annual Palestinian gathering in the US – the Palestine Convention in Chicago, with over 5,000 attendees.²⁰

AMP is currently under pressure on six simultaneous legal fronts:

- A lawsuit that would hold AMP legally liable for Hamas-era financing through predecessor organizations – in pre-trial proceedings;²¹
- A state attorney general investigation into its donor list (federal court partially blocked this, October 2025)
- A US Senate committee investigation opened March 2025
- A congressional request to the IRS to revoke its nonprofit status, September 2024
- A joint legal filing by three US states, January 2026
- A lawsuit by October 7 victims, filed May 2024

Current event: AMP board member Salah Sarsour was arrested by ICE on March 30, 2026 and is currently detained in Indiana. Secretary Rubio

¹⁷ US Department of Treasury (OFAC) and Public Safety Canada, joint designation of Samidoun as terrorist-support organization, October 2024.

<https://ofac.treasury.gov> | <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca>

¹⁸ NGO Monitor, documentation of Samidoun promotional materials (logos, branded merchandise) at PACC 2025 Annual Conference – after the October 2024 US/Canada designation. <https://www.ngomonitor.org>

¹⁹ Algemeiner and JNS, reporting on PACC October 7 atrocity-denial video and subsequent deletion; multiple outlets confirmed "Resistance is always justified" tweet and deletion (2023-24). <https://www.algemeiner.com> | <https://www.jns.org>

²⁰ AJP Educational Foundation IRS Form 990 (revenue figures 2017-2023, ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, EIN 27-1365284); AMP public materials on Palestine Convention 2024 attendance. <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/271365284> | <https://www.muslims4palestine.org>

²¹ Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine (alter-ego liability theory); case in pre-trial proceedings as of May 2026. Case filings via PACER. <https://www.pacer.gov>

has sought his deportation on the basis of his AMP activities.²² This is the first significant individual enforcement action within this organizational network.

²² AMP campaign materials, "Free Salah Sarsour," March-May 2026. Secretary Rubio foreign policy deportation memorandum, June 2025 (cited in AMP litigation materials).
<https://www.muslims4palestine.org>

The Network's Concrete Impact on US Policy: Results of Intensive Political Activity in the United States

- Engagement with Members of Congress and political candidates, including efforts to promote anti-Israel positions and block arms sales through intensive political lobbying.



- Extensive activity within Fatah, including organizing demonstrations, rallies, and solidarity events.

The scale of what this advocacy network has actually achieved, based on congressional archives and executive branch records, is of particular note:

Four Senate Letters — An Accelerating Pattern

Since 2022, four formal Senate letters have gone to the executive branch regarding American deaths in the West Bank, each one larger and faster than the last:

- 2022 (Shireen Abu Akleh): 58 House members²³ and 22 senators²⁴ wrote regarding the killing of the Palestinian-American journalist.
- April 11, 2025 (Amer Rabee): Both New Jersey senators wrote to President Trump within five days. The letter explicitly names their New Jersey constituents' connections to Turmus Ayya.²⁵
 - July 2025 (Saifullah Musallet): 29 senators signed, including Booker and Kim. The letter demanded a full investigation and cited six prior American deaths.²⁶
 - March 5, 2026 (Nasrallah Abu Siyam): 31 senators signed. The letter described Abu Siyam as "the ninth American killed in the West Bank since January 2022" and demanded a State Department briefing within 30 days.²⁷

What this means: The congressional response infrastructure is now fully pre-positioned. A Senate letter with 29-31 signatories follows within weeks of any American death in the West Bank. This capacity did not exist four years ago. Each incident triggers a faster and larger response than the last. The network has effectively built a standing congressional mechanism.

Confirmed Meeting with the US Secretary of State

On May 17, 2024, USPC President John Dabeet met directly with Secretary of State Blinken as part of a five-organization Arab-American delegation.²⁸ This is confirmed by two independent

²³ Rep. Andre Carson et al., letter to Secretary of State regarding Shireen Abu Akleh, 2022 (58 House members).

<https://carson.house.gov>

²⁴ Sen. Jon Ossoff, Sen. Bob Menendez, Sen. Cory Booker et al., letter to Secretary of State, 2022 (22 senators).

<https://www.booker.senate.gov>

²⁵ Sen. Cory Booker and Sen. Andy Kim, letter to President Trump regarding killing of Amer Rabee, April 11, 2025. Cites NJ constituents' connections to Turmus Ayya explicitly.

<https://www.booker.senate.gov> | <https://www.andykim.senate.gov>

²⁶ Sen. Chris Van Hollen et al. (29 senators), letter to Secretary of State Rubio regarding killing of Saifullah Musallet and prior American deaths, July 2025. <https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov>

²⁷ Sen. Chris Van Hollen and Sen. Michael Bennet et al. (31 senators), letter to Secretary of State Rubio regarding killing of Nasrallah Abu Siyam, March 5, 2026.

<https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov> | <https://www.bennet.senate.gov>

²⁸ Arab American Institute, press release, May 17, 2024 (meeting with Secretary Blinken; USPC President John Dabeet quoted as attendee); CNN, reporting on same meeting, May 17, 2024.

<https://www.aaiusa.org> | <https://www.cnn.com>

sources and represents national-level executive branch access that most advocacy organizations never achieve.

Legislation With 100+ Congressional Co-Sponsors

The West Bank Violence Prevention Act (Senate bill S.2667; House bill H.R.3045) would legally require the President to impose mandatory sanctions – travel bans and asset freezes – on anyone committing violence against civilians in the West Bank.²⁹ The House bill currently has over 100 co-sponsors. The Senate bill is led by Senator Booker, the same senator who has driven the Turmus Ayya response letters. This legislation did not exist before the network began its advocacy campaign.

A State Legislator Who Was an Eyewitness

Illinois State Representative Abdelnasser Rashid was physically present in Turmus Ayya during a violent confrontation in June 2023 incident.³⁰ He is the only US elected official with direct eyewitness experience of an incident in Turmus Ayya, and serves as a direct conduit between the village and the legislature that bypasses media entirely.

²⁹ West Bank Violence Prevention Act: S.2667 (Senate, introduced August 2025, lead sponsor Sen. Booker) and H.R.3045 (House, introduced April 2025, lead sponsors Reps. Nadler, Smith, Himes).

<https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/2667> | <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3045>

³⁰ Rep. Abdelnasser Rashid (IL), public statements regarding his presence during June 2023 Turmus Ayya attack.

<https://www.rashid.house.gov>

II. Mashal Alkook

Another key figure in the Turmus Ayya diaspora is Mashal Alkook, a United States citizen who resides intermittently in the village of Turmus Aya and in Chicago. He is considered one of the most prominent inciters and supporters of terrorism in the Binyamin region and within the Palestinian community in Chicago.

Alkook frequently stages, provokes, participates in and then films provocations and staged “settler violence” incidents in the area surrounding Turmus Ayya and Shiloh.

It remains unclear why neither the US nor the Israeli authorities have taken action against him for incitement and support of terrorism.

Alkook is considered so extreme that even the Palestinian Authority reportedly arrested him in 2017.³¹ The organization that led the international campaign for his release was Samidoun – the Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network. Samidoun organized the English-language press campaign, coordinated with Palestinian diaspora organizations in Chicago, and continued to name him in its coverage of PA crackdowns on dissidents.³²

In October 2024, the United States and Canada jointly designated Samidoun as a terrorist-support organization.³³ Samidoun has documented financial ties to the PFLP. The same Samidoun network whose materials were distributed at PACC's 2025 conference is the organization that publicly championed Alkook, and is his primary organizational home in the West. This changes the legal and policy framework for analyzing his activities.

Key findings:

³¹ <https://bit.ly/4u6tNsP>

³² Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, “Take Action: Free Mashal Alkook,” August 2017; Samidoun, September 2017 crackdown coverage naming Alkook alongside Issa Amro. Khaled Abu Toameh, Jewish Press / Gatestone Institute, September 1, 2017. <https://samidoun.net> | <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org>


³³ US Department of Treasury (OFAC) and Public Safety Canada, joint designation of Samidoun, October 2024. <https://ofac.treasury.gov> | <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca>

According to reports, Alkook operates — or previously operated — an online network of Palestinians in the United States.


Alkook has consistently expressed support for the October 7 massacre, as well as for Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas. Among other examples, he has publicly mourned Hassan Nasrallah and Saleh al-Arouri; shared posts praising Ruhollah Khomeini; promoted content in support of the “resistance” axis — Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis; praised Hamas spokesman Abu Obaida; and expressed admiration for former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. He has organized and led pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Chicago, including demonstrations expressing support for the Hamas terrorist organization. In addition, he has voiced harsh criticism of U.S. President Donald Trump and has implied that Trump is an “infidel.”


Below are several examples taken from his Facebook account:³⁴

³⁴ (<https://www.facebook.com/mashal.alkook.5>)




*A flag featuring senior Hamas figure Abu Obaida at a protest attended/led by Alkook in Chicago on March 9, 2024
<https://bit.ly/4nmtYHv>*





A post expressing mourning, praise, and admiration for Hassan Nasrallah, along with senior Hamas officials Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri: <https://bit.ly/430x8xu>



“We are the Flood [Toufan]... We are the day after” – sharing and promoting a Hamas platform/stage event in Gaza: <https://bit.ly/42vmte3>


...

Mashal Alkook

24 ביוני 2025



هيك علمنا التهديد يا خميني يا حريف



Support for former Iranian leader Ruhollah Khomeini: “This is how you taught us to strike, Khomeini – what a master you were.”

https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=21cScc57c3858587&id=1000244c753c782

...

Mashal Alkook

8 באוק' 2025



سيبقى سبعة اكتوبر المجيد
تاج على راس كل حر
و وسمه عار على كل عميل و متخاذل

Explicit support for the October 7 massacre: “It will forever remain the glorious Seventh of October – a crown upon the head of every free person, and a mark of shame upon every traitor and coward.”

...

Mashal Alkook


20 במרץ •




כל عام ו شعبنا و المقاومة و حزب الله و ايران و الحوثين بالف
خير 🍀🍀




Alkook in the United States with Palestine Liberation Organization flags: "Happy New Year to our people, to the resistance, to Hezbollah, to Iran, and to the Houthis"



In praise of Saddam Hussein: <https://bit.ly/48RWpNO>



A post praising Yemen for its actions against the United States and the United Kingdom: <https://bit.ly/4uF6NAO>



*A post praising the terrorists of Gaza:
<https://bit.ly/3R3hpen>*

Action Points

1. Public exposure of Daboob's official role within Fatah may reduce his influence on public opinion in the U.S. and internationally—particularly among policymakers—and challenge his ability to disseminate misleading narratives regarding “settler violence,” while promoting messages that normalize or support terrorism, violence, boycotts of Israel and expressions of antisemitism and anti-Zionism.

There may be grounds to investigate the immigration status of Daboob and Alkook, in light of previous active involvement in terrorism and current support for terrorism.

2. Denial of entry into Israel may expose the gap between these activists' public image as moderate advocates of coexistence versus documented anti-Israel and pro-Hamas activity. Israeli authorities should be encouraged to restrict their freedom of movement in areas frequently featured in anti-Israel narratives (including visits to Jenin, Khan al-Ahmar, Beita, Hebron, Tulkarm, Jericho area “villages”, and other confrontation flashpoints).
3. Review of Imad Daboob's activities and official position in Fatah should be conducted in order to clarify whether he is guilty of violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
4. Larger issues in US immigration policy are intertwined with the Turmus Ayya case; these policy issues are beyond the scope of this brief, and are introduced in an appendix attached below.

Appendix 1: The Unique Demography of A Village Reconstituted

Turmus Ayya sits approximately 20 kilometers north of Ramallah. In the summer months, its population swells from roughly 3,000 permanent residents to 8,000 or more. The difference is the diaspora coming home.

The population trajectory is the starting point for understanding everything that follows.

Census Year	Population / Notes
1931 (British Mandate)	~600 (British census, Palestine Remembered)
1945 (British Mandate)	~890 (Hadawi village statistics)
1961 (Jordanian)	1,620 (Jordanian census — emigration already underway)
1967 (Israeli de facto)	1,562 (West Bank under Israeli military administration)
1989 (Israeli registry)	5,140 (de jure count — inflated by diaspora registrants living abroad)
1997 (PCBS)	~2,100 (Palestinian Authority census)
2007 (PCBS)	~2,200
2017 (PCBS)	2,464 (most reliable floor figure)
2025 (reported)	~3,000 winter / 8,000+ summer (town officials, HRW, multiple sources)

Two numbers in this table deserve attention.

1. The population was already declining between 1961 and 1967 — from 1,620 to 1,562 — before Israeli jurisdiction began. Emigration was underway during the Jordanian period, driven by Ottoman-era patterns of labor migration and post-1948 economic dislocation. The Israeli victory in the Six Day War accelerated an existing trend; it did not create it.

2. The 1989 figure of 5,140 is a de jure registry artifact. It counts diaspora members who registered their families in the village rolls while living in Chicago, New Jersey, and Panama — a practice that preserved land rights and family status in the Palestinian Authority system. The actual resident population during that period was probably between 500 and 900 people. This

is the key demographic fact for understanding the anomaly.

KEY FINDING: The village's non-emigrant population in 1967 was approximately 1,500 people and declining. A non-emigrant cohort of this size, reproducing at West Bank Palestinian birth rates over fifty years, would produce 1,200 to 1,800 descendants today – not 4,000 to 8,000 as the birth-rate arithmetic would suggest if a large local population had remained. The absence of a large non-citizen local population is arithmetically coherent only because the village was already significantly depleted before the major US emigration wave began.

Land confiscation pressure shaped the diaspora's relationship to the village. In 1978, the State of Israel exercised its rights under the Custodian of Abandoned and Enemy Property, and confiscated 752 dunams of abandoned Turmus Ayya land for the Shiloh settlement and a further 372 dunams for Shevut Rachel in 1992. These confiscations were fought in Israeli courts and documented by Palestinian rights organizations. The diaspora's response – building large, permanently constructed villas on family plots throughout the 1980s and 1990s – served simultaneously as investment, cultural maintenance, and legal protection against further designation as absentee property under Israeli military law. The elaborate built environment visible in Turmus Ayya today is not simply a display of diaspora wealth. It is a legal defense strategy.

The result, by the early 2000s, was a village that had been reconstituted by its diaspora. The residents are predominantly returned emigrants, their US-born children, and people who were naturalized through family sponsorship chains and returned to build or maintain homes. This is not a village that happened to generate a large diaspora. It is a diaspora that rebuilt a village – on its own land, for its own reasons – and in doing so created the demographic condition that in turn created what may be called 'the Turmus Ayya phenomenon'.

Section 2: The Numbers Game

It should be noted that this is only one small element in a larger challenge: The anomalous political situation that resulted from the State of Israel's failure to reassert its sovereignty in the areas liberated in 1967, coupled with the pressures created by the Oslo Accords, have resulted in a dearth of reliable demographic data. Palestinian Authority census data is universally recognized as unreliable and unrelated to the reality on the ground; in fact, the World Bank has rejected PA submissions due to gross exaggerations, illogical reporting of deaths and births, inclusion of people whose only connection to the territory is ancestral, etc.

Regavim has been demanding for years that the Israeli government carry out a proper census of the Arab population of Area C without any further delay. At present, no one knows how many non-Israelis live in Area C. The estimates range anywhere from 60,000 to 360,000 - a vast difference.

The Palestinian Authority has two clear interests in maintaining the shroud of uncertainty. First, it can continue to claim that there is a huge population, and receive the benefits, foreign aid, political representation and worldwide

sympathy that comes with the larger number, and more importantly - continue to demand "solutions" - i.e., land resources and building permits - for this large population. The second reason the PA wants to avoid an actual census is because they are very actively changing the population statistics. They offer tax breaks and free land to any resident of Areas A and B who is willing to go and live in Area C. In fact, last year, when annexation seemed far more imminent, PA President a-Shtayyeh announced increased and additional benefits for anyone who moves into the Jordan Valley (also Area C).

Perhaps the larger problem is not the Palestinian Authority's claims, it is the willingness of others - including the Israeli government! - to accept them, or to use similar tactics to achieve other objectives. This has been a long-standing problem: The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory- Area C of the West Bank, Key Humanitarian Concerns report, dated January 2013: "150,000 (approx.) Palestinians live in Area C in 542 communities, 281 of which are located entirely or mostly (50% or more of their built up area) in Area C."

At the end of that same year, an Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report titled "Area C Vulnerability Profile," an inter-agency exercise designed to identify vulnerabilities in Area C, said "that an estimated 297,900 Palestinians live in 532 residential areas in Area C, comprising some of the most vulnerable communities in the West Bank in terms of humanitarian needs."

No one bothered to question how the population doubled itself in one year - even though the report itself explains the reason for this miracle: in gerrymandering fashion, they cobbled together areas that previously had not been considered Area C and included them in the population statistics for Area C:

"The VPP includes detailed information on 532 residential areas located in Area C of the West Bank. Some of these residential areas are located entirely (i.e. 100 per cent) in Area C, but, in many cases, the area is part of a bigger community, part of which lies in Area A or B."

Essentially, to beef up the number of Arabs in Area C, the OCHA report arbitrarily declares some cities that are entirely Arab and entirely in Areas A and B, to have a few parts that are in Area C. That includes Bethlehem with its population (at that time) of 37,777, Jenin 20,879, Shechem 9,583, Qalqiliya 9,598, Ramallah 36,448, Tulkarm 17,625. Add to that Jerusalem, where OCHA counts 73,515 Arabs as living in Area C, even though they actually live in Israel's capital and enjoy residency rights and National Insurance Institute benefits; Hebron, with 67,850 Arabs, whose line of demarcation with Area C lies clearly alongside the Jewish neighborhoods of the city; add a few more Arab towns and villages that are legitimately inside Area C, and you, too, will get the mind-boggling grand total of 297,900.

That same OCHA report also concedes that the Arab municipalities that are 100% in Area C—and which are the only municipalities Israel would ever

consider for inclusion under Israeli law—have a population of only 67,016. The Israeli version of that figure, from 2012, is 47,560 Arabs.

The problem is that everyone, Jews, Arabs, Americans, Swedes and Finns, have been citing the number 300,000 ever since - including then-Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman and the Civil Administration, an arm of the IDF and of the Ministry of Defense. This is the only number you'll find in Wikipedia - without any explanation of the fancy footwork involved.

Appendix II: The Diaspora

How 3,000 People Came to Hold 2,500 US Passports

Cook County, Illinois has more Palestinian residents than any other county in the United States (WBEZ Chicago, November 2023). The Turmus Ayya community is disproportionately concentrated in the Chicago southwestern suburbs: Oak Lawn, Bridgeview, Chicago Ridge, Orland Park. A secondary cluster exists in Clifton and Saddle Brook, New Jersey. A smaller cluster is documented in Memphis, Tennessee. This geographic concentration in specific US cities is the product of chain migration — each naturalized citizen sponsoring family members who settle near existing community members.

The 80 to 90 percent US citizenship rate among Turmus Ayya's permanent residents is the most striking demographic fact about the village and the starting point for the structural analysis. Understanding how it was built matters because it determines how the protection obligation was created and whether the creating mechanism was ordinary, instrumental, or strategic. The answer is: ordinary. But ordinary mechanisms, operating at unusual density over four decades, produced an extraordinary result.

The Four Pathways to Citizenship

US citizenship among Turmus Ayya residents arrived through four legal mechanisms:

Naturalization. The first-generation emigrants who left in the 1960s and 1970s entered the United States on work, student, or visitor visas, adjusted their status, accumulated the five years of lawful permanent residence required for naturalization, and became US citizens. These individuals — now in their sixties, seventies, and eighties — are the foundational layer. Many returned to the village in retirement. They brought US passports with them.

Birthright citizenship. The children of naturalized emigrants were born in Chicago, Paterson, and Memphis. They acquired US citizenship at birth. As adults, many returned to the village where their parents had built homes, either temporarily or permanently. These second-generation returnees are US citizens with genuine American life experience — they grew up in the United States, attended American schools, worked American jobs — who have chosen to live in the ancestral village.

Citizenship transmission. A third pathway requires no US residence at all. Under 8 U.S.C. §1401(g), a child born outside the United States to one US citizen parent acquires citizenship automatically, provided the US citizen parent was physically present in the United States for at least five years prior to the child's birth. A second-generation Palestinian American who grew up in Chicago, returns to Turmus Ayya in their thirties, and has children there has almost certainly met this threshold. Those children are US citizens registered via Consular Report of Birth Abroad at the US Embassy. They may never live in

the United States.

Chain migration sponsorship. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act created an immigration preference system that prioritized family reunification. A naturalized US citizen could sponsor siblings, parents, and adult children for immigrant visas. Those sponsored family members came to the United States, accumulated residence, naturalized, and sometimes returned to the village after obtaining their passports. The sponsorship chain extended the citizenship pipeline to family members with progressively weaker ties to the United States.

Generational Dilution

The critical pattern is generational. First-generation emigrants spent genuine years in the United States — working, paying taxes, raising families, building businesses. Their American identity is substantive even if their ultimate choice was to return to the ancestral village. Second-generation returnees were born in the US and have real American life experience. But the third generation, and increasingly the fourth, occupies a different category entirely.

Case Study: Unexceptional Processes Yield Exceptional Outcomes

Amer Rabee was born in Saddle River, New Jersey in 2011. His family moved to Turmus Ayya when he was approximately two years old. He was killed by Israeli soldiers in April 2025 at age fourteen, having spent twelve of those fourteen years as a West Bank resident. He was a US citizen who had no conscious American life experience. His death generated identical mandatory US institutional responses to those that would follow the killing of any American abroad. Under US law, he was fully American. Under any functional definition, he was a Palestinian child who happened to have been born in New Jersey.

The Rabee case is not exceptional. It is representative of an emerging cohort: US citizens born in the United States — or registered as US citizens through transmission — who were brought to or born in the West Bank before developing any meaningful American identity, and who are now being raised there. The protection framework does not ask how American they are. It responds to the passport.

The Global Context

To calibrate how unusual this demographic configuration is: research conducted for this assessment found no other village, town, or municipality anywhere in the world — outside US territories and military installations — where 80 to 90 percent of the resident population holds US citizenship through the return-migration pattern documented in Turmus Ayya.

The closest documented parallel is Deir Dibwan, also a West Bank Palestinian village, which was estimated at approximately 50 percent US diaspora residency in a 1988 Christian Science Monitor report. American expatriate enclaves (San Miguel de Allende, Lake Chapala, Boquete) max out at 10 to 16 percent — and those are Americans who moved there, not foreign nationals

who became Americans and returned. Lebanese southern villages, Yemeni highland villages, and Dominican Republic diaspora communities are plausible unconfirmed candidates for high return-migration citizenship concentration, but no documented figures approach the Turmus Ayya rate.

The pattern is not primarily a Palestinian phenomenon generally. West Bank Palestinians in Lebanon and Jordan have been there since 1948 and mostly did not receive US citizenship. The West Bank Palestinian community specifically – able to maintain land rights through Israeli courts, incentivized to build on family plots, with access to US immigration through the 1965 Act – created a unique combination of conditions that produced the Turmus Ayya demographic.

Appendix IV: US Immigration Policy and Inversion of the Protection Framework

The US citizenship protection framework was built around a specific and unstated assumption: the American being protected has a genuine American life: The diplomat's child studying abroad. The journalist covering a conflict. The businessperson on assignment. The tourist caught in unexpected violence. For all of these, the protection framework projects US obligations outward from a genuine national community to citizens who find themselves in danger.

The framework has no test for the depth of citizenship. It responds to the passport. This was never a design flaw because it never needed to be addressed — the assumption was structurally embedded in who was traveling abroad in the first place.

The Protection Gap

Turmus Ayya exists in a specific jurisdictional configuration that maximizes the pressure the citizenship creates. Area B of the West Bank is under Palestinian Authority civil administration and Israeli military security control. It is not Israeli sovereign territory. It is not a recognized Palestinian state. The PA cannot provide meaningful military protection to its residents. Israel does not accept responsibility for civilian incidents under the framework that would apply to its own citizens. There is no sovereign power whose job it is to protect Turmus Ayya residents and account to the US government for their treatment.

This protection vacuum means that when a US citizen is killed or seriously harmed in Turmus Ayya, the US government faces a mandatory response obligation with no other state to share or deflect it. Unlike the death of a US citizen in France, where the French government is available as a diplomatic interlocutor and has its own accountability obligations, the West Bank creates a gap that only Washington can fill.

The comparison with Israeli-American dual citizens clarifies the asymmetry. Israeli-Americans serving in the IDF or living in Israel exist within a recognized sovereign's jurisdiction. Israel has diplomatic relations with the US and handles its affairs through normal state-to-state channels. Their US citizenship adds political weight but does not create a protection gap. The protection obligation exists but is diplomatically manageable.

Palestinian Americans in Turmus Ayya have no equivalent diplomatic management channel. The obligation is mandatory and direct.

Not Narrative Risk — Political Risk

It is important to be precise about what kind of risk the mechanism described in this document creates. Narrative risk is when an actor tells a story that influences public opinion — the government can weigh that influence against

other interests and choose a response. Political risk is when a legal or institutional mechanism is triggered that the government must respond to regardless of its other interests.

The protection framework creates political risk. The Department of Justice does not choose whether to consider 18 U.S.C. §1119 when a US citizen is killed abroad – the statute creates an obligation. Congressional offices do not choose whether to respond to constituent inquiries about harmed family members – constituent services is a fundamental obligation of elected representation. The State Department does not choose whether to register a formal concern when American citizens are killed by the military forces of a close ally – diplomatic protocol creates that obligation.

None of these responses requires advocacy, lobbying, or political pressure. They fire automatically when the triggering condition – a US citizen involved in a serious incident abroad – occurs. The role of the Turmus Ayya diaspora network is to ensure that every incident involving Turmus Ayya residents is rapidly communicated through channels that activate these automatic responses.

The Incentive This Creates

If the killing of a US citizen in Turmus Ayya produces mandatory institutional responses that accumulate into documented US foreign policy changes, then US citizen deaths and incidents in Turmus Ayya are high-value political events. The political value is not incidental. It is the product of the structure.

High political value creates incentives. This is not a psychological claim about intent. It is an analytical claim about incentive structures.

Any actor who understands the US institutional machinery and wants to generate maximum pressure from West Bank incidents has a structural incentive to position themselves at, or create the conditions for, confrontations in locations where US citizens are present or where US citizen involvement can be documented; ensure that incidents are filmed and the US citizenship of those involved is identified and communicated rapidly; and maximize the documentary record of US citizen involvement, because the political value is commensurate with the quality and clarity of documentation.

This does not require engineering deaths. It requires positioning – being present, filming, identifying, and communicating. Opportunistic positioning near flashpoints in a conflict zone populated by high-political-value individuals is a rational strategy for anyone who understands the downstream consequences.

Conclusion:

The core policy question is this: the US citizenship protection framework was built on an assumption about who US citizens are. That assumption is being operated against by a demographic configuration the framework's architects did not anticipate and did not design for. The framework creates mandatory obligations that are being activated by a community whose citizenship

connection to the United States ranges from genuine to nominal to effectively absent. Addressing this structural gap does not require creating second-class citizenship – a constitutionally prohibited and morally objectionable course. It requires policy tools that acknowledge the reality of voluntary conflict zone residence and modify the institutional response accordingly.