
False Flags and Real Agendas

**"Settler Violence" -
A Modern Blood Libel**

April 2025 | Iyar 5785



False Flags and Real Agendas

The Making of a Modern Blood Libel:

**The 'Settler Violence' Narrative as a
Weapon in the Battle to Delegitimize
the Jewish Presence in Judea and
Samaria and the State of Israel**

April 2025 | Iyar 5785

Written by: Attorney Yona Admoni (Coblentz), Moriah Michaeli
Research: Attorney Yona Admoni (Coblentz), Naomi Linder Kahn, Moran Tal
Edited by: Avraham Binyamin and Tamr Sikurel
Translated by Naomi Linder Kahn
Graphic Design: Hamutal Lawrence

Photo credits: Hanan Arad, Hakol HaYehudi, The Regavim Movement, The Har Hevron Regional Council, "Yisrael Sheli", Kobi Gidon, National Photo Archive


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Table of contents

I. The Making of A Modern Blood Libel: Executive Summary	7
United Nations Data: The Case of OCHA	10
Data obtained from Israel National Police and other Law Enforcement Authorities	11
Implications of the Narrative – International and Domestic	13
Recommendations for Action	14
Summary	14
II. Introduction	17
III. What is the “settler violence” narrative?	21
The Agenda, or How the System Works	28
IV. Debunking the Narrative	33
Unreliability of Reports on “Settler Violence”	34
UN Data and Reports	35
V. False Alarm? Israel Police and Security Forces Data	55
VI. Crime Data in Israel – A Comparative Overview	67
VII. The Hole in the Boat: Ramifications of the ‘Settler Violence’ Campaign for the State of Israel	75
The Campaign’s Implications in the International Arena	76
The Campaign’s Impact Within Israeli Society	85
The Vanguard: The Organizations Leading the Campaign	88
VII. The Money Trail and the Agenda’s Route	95
VIII. Summary and Recommendations	99
Summary	100
Recommendations	104
Appendices	105
Appendix 1: Analysis of the UN Incident List Claimed to Underpin OCHA’s Database	106
Appendix 2: Comparison Between the Number of Fatalities and Injuries in the Incident List and the Number in the Database	108
Appendix 3 – Comparison of Events as Listed by the UN vs. Reality	113
Appendix 4: Additional Cases Reported in Neverland	123

False Flags and Real Agendas


I. The Making of A Modern Blood Libel: Executive Summary



In recent years, and not coincidentally, the concept of “settler violence” has begun to seep into the discourse in Israel and around the world. What began some two decades ago with anarchists harassing IDF soldiers using cameras and provocations, continued in 2018 with a high-end campaign to alter public perception and inculcate messaging regarding violent Israeli settlers through newspaper ads and giant billboards along Israeli highways. Later, “settler violence” became the main topic of conversation at the first White House meeting between the Prime Minister of Israel and newly-elected US President Joe Biden. This conversation led to weekly meetings of the heads of Israel’s law enforcement and security systems on one hand, and a series of international sanctions on individuals and organizations on the other.

One essential thing was never done at any point in this evolving process: no one stopped for even a moment to examine the data.

A generously funded, carefully planned and well-organized campaign created a false perception of a widespread phenomenon of violence by settlers in Judea and Samaria against Arab residents in the area; the campaign’s objective was to turn spread the perception to the point that it became common knowledge, an undisputed fact. The campaign was accompanied by videos and pictures that served as “proof” that these were not isolated incidents. The campaign was designed to imprint the idea that this was a widespread phenomenon, and that the violent behavior was that of an entire segment of the population, a community of violent, lawbreaking settlers. But how did such marginal and isolated incidents turn into a “dangerous phenomenon” that the heads of the Shin Bet and the police deal with daily—at the same time that Hamas was planning the largest terror attack in history? On what data did U.S. President Joe Biden base his decision to impose draconian sanctions—a tool intended to



fight heads of international terror organizations and state leaders responsible for genocide—against farmers, social activists, civil society organizations and private companies?

The answer is simple – infuriatingly so. The “settler violence” campaign was buttressed by a significant amount of data that paint a picture of widespread Israeli settler violence in Judea and Samaria against Arab residents. Let it be clear from the outset: This report does not deny that there are Israelis who act violently toward Palestinians; it asserts that this is not a widespread phenomenon. Incidents of violence are deserving of condemnation and legal treatment—and are indeed being addressed by Israeli authorities, as will be detailed extensively in the pages that follow.

There is a vast gap between the branding, focus, and preoccupation with marginal incidents of violence perpetrated by Jews against Arabs in comparison with the incidence, frequency, severity and prevalence of other incidents of violence—in Judea and Samaria, in Israel as a whole, and worldwide.

The chapters that follow reveal, for the first time, the database upon which one of the most dangerous blood libels of the modern era has been built. This report will systematically dismantle all the databases maintained and funded by foreign governments in support of the claim that a phenomenon of “settler violence” exists. Additionally, it will examine aspects of Jewish versus Arab nationalist crime in Israel, by district and year.

Alongside data analysis and refutation of the claims regarding the “settler violence” phenomenon, the report reviews the operational methods used to construct the narrative. Thus, the report examines the narrative-makers and campaign leaders—including the planning and coordination of provocations in which official representatives of the Palestinian Authority take part, in cooperation with Israeli and foreign left-wing organizations who actively initiate organized confrontations with IDF soldiers and Jewish residents in an attempt to provoke them into violent behavior which is then filmed and edited to fuel the narrative.

This activity, combined with media, diplomatic, and legal amplification of the event and any outcomes, is funded via foreign money routes that are tracked in the final chapters of the research.

We will examine how this campaign serves the agenda of undermining Israeli jurisdiction and control in Judea and Samaria and promoting the establishment of a Palestinian state, and we will review the severe consequences stemming from it—consequences that undermine the standing and legitimacy of the State of Israel in the international arena.



United Nations Data: The Case of OCHA

The United Nations (UN) produces reports on “settler violence” through the website of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), where it claims to actively document and tally current incidents of nationalistic violence in Judea and Samaria, including East Jerusalem. Events are classified according to their outcomes: fatalities or physical injuries, property damage, and incidents without damage or injury.

The visual database on OCHA’s website (hereinafter: “the database” or “the system”), linked under the heading “Settler-related violence,” is based on an updated and detailed Excel table (hereinafter: “the table”). This list includes 8,332 “incidents involving Israeli settlers and other Israeli civilians” that occurred in the West Bank or Israel (not in Gaza) between January 11, 2016, and April 30, 2023.

These two sources, the table and the database, rely on circular sources of information, suffer from severe credibility issues and lack synchronization between them, and present a false, distorted, and inflated picture – sometimes by hundreds or thousands of percent. Below is a summary of the main distortions, which are expanded upon in the body of the report:

- The database counts Palestinians who were injured or killed during or in response to attacks and terrorist acts they themselves initiated against Israeli civilians in Judea, Samaria, and the rest of the country, as victims of “settler violence.”

- The database undercounts incidents of violence perpetrated by Palestinian Arabs and the number of Israeli casualties – compared to official Israeli government data. There is also a lack of correlation between the database and the table regarding the number of Palestinian casualties.
- The UN database includes thousands of clearly non-violent incidents in its count of violent events. For example: Jewish visits to the Temple Mount, tourists visiting archaeological sites, infrastructure work carried out legally by the State of Israel itself, traffic accidents, and more.
- Some 20% of the incidents listed by the UN database occurred in Jerusalem, not in Judea and Samaria – and therefore are unrelated to “settler violence.”
- Approximately 19% of the incidents documented in Judea and Samaria involve general complaints such as “trespassing” that refer to the presence of Israeli tourists and hikers, which did not include assault or damage to property or individuals.
- About 1,000 of the incidents are based solely on a single source – the Palestinian Authority’s District Coordination and Liaison Office – which is misleadingly presented as two separate sources.
- **After filtering out thousands of irrelevant cases, only 833 incidents remain over a 7.5-year period - a mere 10% of the original list. This translates to approximately 9.4 allegations of Jewish nationalist physical violence per month, on average, over the cited period. Alarming, among these are dozens of clear cases of Arab terrorist attacks against Jews misclassified as “settler violence.”**

Data obtained from Israel National Police and other Law Enforcement Authorities

For the purpose of this study, and in the absence of publicly available data, the Israel Police was requested—under the Freedom of Information Law (1998)—to provide all information in its possession regarding criminal and nationalistic violence cases from 2014 to 2024 in the State of Israel:

- **Between 2014–2024, 1356 files were opened** by the Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police on suspicion of Jewish nationalist violence. **Investigations were launched in 537 of those cases.** Some of these offenses had no connection to violence or nationalism, such as car theft, drug possession, etc.
- **The reasons for closing cases** related to Jewish nationalist violence in

Judea and Samaria were: “**circumstances not justifying prosecution (8%), lack of evidence (19%), or unknown offender (72%)** – similar to the national average for case closures on these grounds, for both Jewish and Arab nationalist crimes. Thus, the official data from the Israel Police contradicts the claims of the organization “Yesh Din,” the leading voice of the “settler violence” campaign.

- A cross-analysis between Knesset Research and Information Center data and Yesh Din’s claims shows that **the rate of complaints by Arabs in Judea and Samaria is significantly higher** than elsewhere in the country. The fact that a very high percentage of these complaints do not amount to anything may be attributed to the intensive activity of provocateurs, and to the weaponization of “lawfare” tactics by pro-Palestinian organizations as a means of delegitimizing the Israeli enforcement system, rather than an indication of heightened levels of violence by Israelis living beyond the “green line.”
- **The indictment rate against Jewish Israelis** for nationalist violence offenses throughout Israel is **three times higher than the indictment rate against Arab Israelis** for the same types of offenses.
- **The conviction rate for nationalist offenses** – both Jewish and Arab – is approximately 50% of the total indictments filed, which is **significantly lower than the national conviction rate**, which stands at around 85%. The skewed ratio is a result of the exaggerated rate of complaints filed, as detailed above.
- The conviction rate for Jewish nationalist violence stands at **36%**



nationwide versus **56%** for Arab nationalist violence. In Judea and Samaria, the conviction rate for Jews is the lowest – **31%**. In light of the fact that indictments against Jews are filed at three times the rate, this too is evidence of selective enforcement targeting Jews.

- **Senior police officials have stated on multiple occasions** that the overwhelming majority of complaints received by police against Jewish violence in Judea and Samaria turn out to be false, submitted by left-wing movements and anarchist elements whose aim is to inflame the area.

Implications of the Narrative – International and Domestic

1. In the International Arena:

- Anti-Israel campaigns use the “settler violence” narrative to justify sanctions and political pressure, which has caused and continues to cause significant harm to individuals, organizations, and the State of Israel internationally.
- International media portrays Israel negatively while ignoring the broader context of the conflict.
- International bodies rely on one-sided reports for legal and policy decisions.



2. In the Domestic Arena:

- A false public awareness is created, damaging the public image of Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria and effectively aiding the establishment of a Palestinian state.
- Increased, selective legal action against settlers is based on partial or distorted information.
- There is an imbalance in law enforcement policy toward Jews and Palestinians.

Recommendations for Action

1. **Data Integration:** Consolidate the data from various enforcement bodies – Police, IDF, and Shin Bet – to create relevant information for global stakeholders to counter the delegitimization campaign, and simultaneously address fringe phenomena present in any society without fostering or encouraging harmful generalizations.
2. **Proactive Public Diplomacy:** The State of Israel must initiate a fact-based public diplomacy campaign to refute the false narrative and present a truthful picture of the reality on the ground.
3. **Removal of Hostile Elements** such as OCHA and local and foreign field organizations that inflame tensions and help spread falsehoods.

Summary

The narrative of “settler violence” does not fully reflect reality, but rather serves as a tool to advance political agendas both internationally and domestically. The data shows that the extent of violence perpetrated by Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria is significantly lower than portrayed in the media, and that Palestinian violence is the primary cause of regional instability. Proactive steps must be taken without delay, utilizing media and diplomatic channels to correct distortions, present reliable data, and implement clear policy and legal strategies to protect the State of Israel and its citizens.

Of the **6,285** incidents classified in the UN report as “Jewish violence against Arabs”:




20%

did not occur in Judea and Samaria



16%

Jewish visits to the Temple Mount or confrontations between Muslims and security forces on the Temple Mount



19%

general trespassing complaints, such as hikers entering land – no assault or damage to property or persons involved

Out of the entire UN database, only **833** incidents were classified as settler violence against Palestinians in Judea and Samaria that resulted in bodily harm.



48%

Of these, “involvement in clashes” is noted without indicating who was at fault.



14%

involved clashes with security forces




98%

of cases of harm/death of Palestinians reported by the UN resulted from clashes with security forces and are not attributed to ‘settlers’ in any way.



The UN does not reveal how many of the incidents in its database involve terrorist who were injured or killed while attacking Jews.



See the data in Chapter 5, below (summarized in the chart titled “Case Resolution: From Investigation to Indictment and Conviction,” p. 60

False Flags and Real Agendas

II. Introduction





In recent years, and particularly since October 7, 2023, the term “settler violence” has increasingly migrated from the discourse of radical left-wing organizations into mainstream media and parts of the Israeli leadership. This terminology now serves as a central pillar in a broader campaign aimed at discrediting the State of Israel and the IDF, and at justifying disproportionate sanctions against individuals, nonprofits, and organizations—often without any proven wrongdoing or evidence of violence on their part.

Until the most recent U.S. elections, this campaign contributed, among other things, to the imposition of sanctions by the United States, as well as to ongoing sanctions from European countries and the European Union.

The use of this narrative is intended to delegitimize Israel’s right to govern Judea and Samaria and to promote the establishment of a Palestinian state, whether in the short or long term. Following the atrocities of October 7, which distanced the prospect of a Palestinian state and shattered the illusion of the so-called “noncombatant” narrative¹, proponents of the “settler violence” campaign have redoubled their efforts—either fabricating or amplifying incidents of violence—in an attempt to bring the issue back to the international agenda.

In direct parallel to Palestinian claims of harm by “settlers” in places like Kfar Aza and Ramat Gan,² the **“settler violence”** campaign likewise extends beyond

1 As can be seen in surveys revealing the widespread support among the general population in Judea and Samaria for the October 7 massacre: See, for example, “Poll shows Palestinians back Oct. 7 attack on Israel, support for Hamas rises,” Reuters 14.12.2023.

2 A report by Palestinian Television in Gaza from October 2024 (beginning at 0:47),

the residents of Judea and Samaria. The broadening of the term “settler” enables the campaign’s architects to deepen the delegitimization not only of specific individuals but of the entire Israeli public — and ultimately, the State of Israel itself.

Years ago, the radical left-wing organization **B’Tselem** captured the essence of this agenda with the slogan: “Settler violence = state violence.” This framing clearly expresses the campaign’s objective — to conflate settlers with IDF soldiers and to undermine the moral foundations of both the Israeli military and the State of Israel as a whole.


This report reviews the development of the “settler violence” narrative, its goals, key drivers, and consequences. It explains the serious threat this narrative poses to the State of Israel and systematically analyzes and refutes the fundamental claims upon which it is built.

It is worth noting that this issue is not among the core areas of focus for the organization behind this report. However, the growing use of this narrative as a weapon against Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria — and increasingly against Israeli citizens more broadly — has made it a strategic tool to erode Israel’s claim to its land. For this reason, we have chosen to delve deeply into the subject and examine it thoroughly. We believe this report will expose the web of falsehoods upon which the narrative is built and help restore a measure of truth and justice to public discourse after years of damaging accusations.

a report by Al Jazeera on X (formerly Twitter) dated January 29, 2023, and a report from September 7, 2024, on the Al-Qastal Telegram channel—operated by Arab Israelis—about a large “settler” demonstration in Tel Aviv: <https://t.me/AlQastalps/216359>

False Flags and Real Agendas

III. What is the “settler violence” narrative?



For several years—and with increased intensity since October 7, 2023—the Palestinian Authority, Israeli radical left-wing organizations, and anti-Israel international bodies have been actively working to construct a false narrative of “settler violence.”³

This is a **one-sided and biased campaign**, heavily promoted by its proponents, which **claims that Israeli settlers systematically and deliberately engage in widespread violence against Palestinian residents and their property in various forms.**

We will examine the interests, agenda, and serious consequences associated with this narrative.

Simply put, the “settler violence” narrative is designed to delegitimize the State of Israel’s right to govern Judea and Samaria and to promote the establishment of a Palestinian state. The campaign seeks to portray Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria specifically—and Israeli citizens more broadly—as inherently violent, extending that image to include the IDF and other security forces operating in the region. Moreover, it does not merely depict them as violent, but as murderers whose continued presence in Judea and Samaria is fundamentally illegitimate.



3 For further discussion on the “settler violence” narrative, see: Shiloh Forum et al., “The Organized Campaign by the Palestinian Authority, Radical Left-Wing Organizations, and International Bodies Against the State of Israel.”

This labeling strategy enables the architects of the narrative to both undermine the legitimacy of Israelis' right to self-defense and to portray isolated acts of violence by Israelis as morally equivalent to far more severe, widespread, and even institutionalized acts of violence by Palestinians — including the atrocities committed by Hamas during the October 7, 2023 massacre.⁴

It appears that this branding aims to revive discussion of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders — a proposal that has lost both feasibility and legitimacy, domestically and internationally, in the wake of the October 7 horrors.


The “settler violence” campaign is one facet of a broader, organized effort led by the Palestinian Authority, supported by various organizations, to gain control over Area C and to establish a de facto Palestinian state unilaterally, in violation of the Oslo Accords.

This campaign to assert control over Area C includes a coordinated delegitimization strategy aimed at weakening Israeli governance and sovereignty in Judea and Samaria. It seeks to promote boycotts and sanctions against the State of Israel and Israeli entities through various means — including the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, attempts to bring senior Israeli officials before the International Criminal Court in The Hague,⁵ and the ongoing “settler violence” narrative.

It is important to note that Arabs in Judea and Samaria — and across the

4 “The Fraudulent Case Against ‘Violent Settlers.’” Tablet Magazine, 8.2.2024. <https://bit.ly/4kM6Eqx>; according to Tal Koppel, from the American perspective there is an inherent imbalance between the Jewish person with statehood and sovereignty and the Palestinian person without statehood and sovereignty, which will only be corrected through the establishment of a democratic and liberal Palestinian state. For this reason, the Americans invest significant time and money in the “settler violence” campaign and in efforts to equate the severity of violent acts. For example, in the podcast Derech HaMachshava with Shiran Raz, in the episode “The ‘Settler Violence’ Campaign and U.S. Involvement in the Political Solution” of November 30, 2023, Koppel notes that after the brutal murder by Palestinian terrorists of the Hillel brothers and Yigal Yaniv in Hawara on 26 February 2023, Jewish youths carried out riots in Hawara, burning property and injuring an Arab. However, the entire discourse of the American administration focused on the Jewish riots or treated them as equivalent to the murder. In other words, from the American point of view, a Jewish attack on a vehicle is considered equal to the Palestinian murder of two youths.

5 “International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant.” i24 News, 21/11/2024. <https://bit.ly/4e5UDdv>



Arab world more broadly — systematically refer to any Israeli as a “settler.”⁶ This expansive use of the term allows the campaign’s organizers to deepen the delegitimization of the broader Israeli public and of the State of Israel itself.

This intent is clearly illustrated by the title that the left-wing organization B’Tselem gave to the campaign years ago: “Settler violence = state violence.”⁷ With this framing, the campaign seeks to equate Israeli settlers with IDF soldiers and to undermine the moral foundations of both the Israeli military and the State of Israel as a whole.

Let it be stated clearly from the outset: **this report does not deny that there are instances in which Israelis have committed acts of violence against Palestinians.** Such incidents are deserving of condemnation and legal action by the appropriate authorities — and, in fact, they are addressed by the Israeli justice system.⁸ However, this is a marginal phenomenon that does

6 See footnote 2, above.

7 See B’Tselem’s website: https://www.btselem.org/topic/settler_violence

8 For example: Liran Tamari, “Detention Extended for Three Right-Wing Activists Questioned After Nationalist Incidents in Judea and Samaria,” Ynet, June 26, 2023; Hanan Greenwood, Avi Cohen, “Serious Indictments Filed Against Three Youths for Assaulting Palestinians in Samaria,” Israel Hayom, September 16, 2024, <https://www.israelhayom.co.il/news/law/article/16448989>; <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/rypftg7o3>

not represent the silent majority of settlers, many of whom have publicly and unequivocally condemned such behavior.⁹

As of January 2024, more than half a million Israeli residents live in Judea and Samaria.¹⁰

As for the number of Palestinians living in Judea and Samaria, in the absence of reliable census data, estimates vary, ranging from 1.6 million to over 3 million



Arab rioters and anarchists in action

- 9 Finance Minister and Minister in the Ministry of Defense Bezalel Smotrich acknowledged violence during the evacuation of an outpost in a Knesset discussion. See: Elisha Ben Kimon and Einav Halabi, "Netanyahu and Gallant Remain Silent After Violence During Outpost Evacuation. That Night: 'Palestinian Homes Were Set on Fire,'" Ynet, July 4, 2024; Condemnation from the head of the Har Etzion Yeshiva: "Rabbi Moshe Lichtenstein: 'A moral stain that taints us all,'" Arutz 7, March 30, 2023; Yair Sheleg, "Youth Counselors, Employment, and Rehabilitative Activities: How to Address Hilltop Youth Violence," Maariv, November 3, 2019.
- 10 To be precise, 517,407 residents, according to the Population Data Report in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley, as of January 2024. See the Yesh Council website: <https://bit.ly/4kkxndZ>



Arab rioter attacking IDF soldiers

people.¹¹

The number of Jewish residents in Judea and Samaria whose names have been linked to incidents of violence is in the low hundreds.¹² Even if we exaggerate and take a harsh estimate of 1,000 individuals involved in such acts, that still represents only 0.2% of the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria and just 0.01% of Israel's total citizenry.

It is also important to note that incidents of violence by Israeli civilians do not occur in a vacuum. Without justifying them, they take place in the broader context of a long-standing and ongoing conflict, marked by sustained and severe Palestinian Arab-Muslim violence and provocations—often violent—by Palestinians and far-left activists (which will be discussed in detail later) against Israelis. This includes uprooting Israeli-owned trees, stealing livestock,

11 Shahrar Citron, "How has the Number of Arabs Living in Judea and Samaria remained a mystery?," Israel Defense and Security Forum website, February 27, 2024. <https://idsf.org.il/en/opinion-en/arabs-in-judea-and-samaria-2/> . Asaf Yishi, Maariv, October 12, 2022: "Behind the Numbers: The 'Demographic Threat to the Jewish People' Is a False Propaganda Campaign." (Hebrew)

12 According to Israel National Police data, received on 11 February 2025, in response to a Freedom of Information petition. Hereafter: Israel Police -FOI data.

stone-throwing to stabbing and shooting attacks and the murder of Israeli soldiers and civilians.

Responsibility for addressing Palestinian terrorism of course lies squarely with Israel's security services and must never be placed in the hands of civilians. However, just as research has long shown that economic inequality contributes to criminal behavior,¹³ so too does life under constant threat of terrorism and regular exposure to death and Arab violence inevitably influence some toward criminal responses of this kind.

In this context, even though Palestinian violence far exceeds Israeli violence both in scale and in severity, it is almost entirely ignored in the “settler violence” campaign—an omission that in and of itself undermines the credibility of the entire narrative.

Just as today's legal and law enforcement systems recognize the deep injustices that arise from profiling—stigmatizing an entire population based on the crimes of a few—so too must we recognize that the vilification of settlers is an ongoing moral wrong that must be stopped.



Foreign” activists “in Judea and Samaria

-
- 13 Evidence is provided in a report by Eran Itzkowitz, “Economic inequality and criminality: analysis on the individual level. Hebrew University and the National Insurance Institute. <https://www.btl.gov.il/Mediniyut/BakashatNetunim/dohot/milga/Documents/eshivyonkalkali.pdf>

The Agenda, or How the System Works

As stated, since actual violence on the ground is limited to marginal percentages, and since the use of this narrative is intended to aid in the delegitimization of the settler public and the State of Israel as a whole for the overarching goal of establishing a Palestinian state, the narrative's architects have constructed their argument using several components:¹⁴

Planning and Coordinating Provocation Operations – The Palestinian Authority and left-wing organizations orchestrate organized confrontations with IDF soldiers and settlers in an attempt to provoke them into reacting violently and to capture these reactions on camera.

4. **Leading the Confrontation Events** – Field activists from among West Bank Arabs, left-wing organizations, and foreign organizations stand at the forefront of most events and engage physically with settlers and security forces. In line with the detailed plan mentioned above (1), foreign activists arrive in Israel in an organized manner using tourist visas, as pilgrims, or as employees of organizations with valid entry permits. Together with local West Bank Arab activists and left-wing organizations, they intentionally inflame the situation through carefully orchestrated provocations or violent incidents.¹⁵

These provocations are all accompanied by carefully staged and meticulously edited documentation, intended to produce false and exaggerated reports; the activists "regularly film everyday activities of both IDF soldiers and residents of the Jewish communities.

In the South Hebron Hills, the dominant actors are typically Arab field operatives who direct Israeli and foreign activists to areas of friction. When they fail to incite a sufficiently violent and well-documented incident, they fabricate events or distort minor incidents. At times, they even damage the property of local Arabs themselves and blame the settlers or the army.¹⁶ The pinnacle of these organizations' intensive activity is vividly

14 The Shiloh Policy Forum et al., "The Organized Campaign of the Palestinian Authority, Radical Left-Wing Organizations, and International Organizations Against the State of Israel."

15 See, for example: Hanan Greenwood, "Two German leftist 'activists' Infiltrate Jewish community in Hebron Area, Engage in confrontation with IDF soldiers; their cell phones contain pro-Hamas materials," Israel Hayom, 6 October 2024.

16 On the left-wing website +972, for example, an article titled "Chronicle of Abuse: Report from South Hebron Hills," dated November 21, 2023, presents what it claims is documentation from Masafer Yatta: "Friends, just to update you. They (i.e., the



Anarchists documenting clashes with security forces

reflected in the neo-antisemitic propaganda film *No Other Land*, which has been warmly embraced by audiences seeking to reinforce this narrative worldwide¹⁷.

In most cases ,the main instigators of violent incidents are the foreign organizations and left-wing activist groups .This is evident in authentic footage in which ,according to the IDF ,an activist from the left-wing organization *Ta'ayush* ,which focuses its activities in the Jordan Valley, threatened local Bedouins .He allegedly told them that if they did not join

settlers) did a tour, we're here. They passed through the village twice, they didn't approach or speak to anyone, they filmed from the bus and from their cars. They arrived with a large bus and seven private vehicles. It seems like they're planning something big, we hope everything stays safe here." The supposedly threatening description does not reflect even a fraction of what actually occurred on the ground: a tour of foreign journalists led by the South Hebron Hills Regional Council and the Regavim Movement. However, the description itself manages to convey to the reader an implied threat and a sense of planned violence—which neither occurred nor was planned. In this way, the falsehood is published and amplified.

- 17 See, for example, Hanan Greenwood: "Fact-checking "No Other Land:" The Distortions and Outright Lies in the Oscar-Winning 'Documentary', Israel Hayom 6 March 2025.

him in staging provocations near Jewish communities ,he would report them to the Palestinian Authority's security forces¹⁸.

5. **Documentation and Reporting** – As mentioned, a core part of this targeted defamation activity is carried out through biased documentation. The far-left organizations Yesh Din and B'Tselem began operating in 2005, collecting testimonies—allegedly from Palestinians—about “settler violence” and presenting the data to the public, either directly or through other so-called “peace-seeking” organizations.¹⁹ Accordingly, in 2008, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) began publishing similar reports with data dating back to 2006–2008. Among its listed sources are reports and data from the far-left organizations Yesh Din, Peace Now, and B'Tselem.
6. **Israeli and International Propaganda** – Pressure is exerted through international institutions. Palestinian Authority officials brief ambassadors, consuls, and representatives of foreign states on so-called “settler attacks.”²⁰ Israeli left-wing organizations also serve the BDS movements by using the documented materials and calling for international community intervention and harm to Israeli sovereignty.²¹ These documentation

18 According to the report, this was revealed in a recording of a Bedouin who spoke with a security official in the area, and also appears in an official IDF document following an interrogation of Bedouins by soldiers. See: “Research Report on Organized Land Takeover Under the Palestinian Authority and with the Aid of Left-Wing Organizations: This Is How the Body Behind the Organized Arab Takeover in Judea and Samaria Operates”, HaKol HaYehudi, Struggle for Every Dunam, August 2022, p. 31. Also see a post by Elchanan Gruner from April 3, 2024: “Exposed: The Left-Wing Activists Who Broke the Silence”, on the Facebook page of HaKol HaYehudi.

19 “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root,” The International Crisis Group: <https://bit.ly/4dCthLL>

20 For example, on February 22, 2024, the then-Governor of Hebron, Khaled Abd al-Aziz Tah Dawadin, briefed ambassadors, consuls, and foreign representatives from 36 European countries about “the suffering of Hebron residents as a result of the occupation and settler attacks.” See: “Appointment of New Palestinian Authority District Governors,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, March 18, 2024 (<https://bit.ly/3Z5EG0s>). Another example: fabricated information and reports on the website of the Committee Against the Wall and Settlements; see above.

21 For example, “Urgent Call to the International Community – Stop the Transfer in the West Bank” calls on “the international community to act urgently to stop the wave of settler violence carried out with state support.” It is signed by a long list of



materials are also used in propaganda by foreign organizations and serve as the basis for reports to the UN,²² the European Union, and the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

7. **Fundraising and Financing** – This is overseen by international organizations. The campaign's funding and field activities are supported by institutional entities (such as the European Union, the UN, and European states), as well as foundations and international organizations (such as AFPS and RCDP).

left-wing organizations that present themselves as human rights and civil society groups in Israel.

Itamar Eichner ,Elisha Ben Kimon ,and Einav Halabi" ,*U.S .:Concerned About Significant Rise in Violence Against Palestinians in the West Bank* "Ynet:31.10.2023 , "In response to the rise in violent incidents ,the Palestinian Foreign Ministry called for' urgent international intervention 'to stop what they claim are' crimes committed by IDF forces and settlers"..."

- 22 For example, OCHA oPt , "Israeli settler violence in light of outpost evacuations", November 2009; OCHA oPt, "Unprotected: Israeli settler violence against Palestinian civilians and their property", December 2008. This report is based on reports and data published by B'Tselem, Peace Now, and Yesh Din.

False Flags and Real Agendas

IV. Debunking the Narrative



We will now examine to what extent the narrative of “settler violence” is unfounded—both due to the unreliability of the facts, figures, and reports presented by various international and Israeli bodies, and in light of the actual data, especially when those facts are placed in their correct and real context and examined comparatively.

Unreliability of Reports on “Settler Violence”

Civil society organizations in Israel and abroad, alongside institutional organizations such as the UN, purport to collect and provide data on “settler violence.” These data are presented either as summary reports for certain periods or as seemingly real-time reports on individual incidents. The credibility of these reports is undermined due to the types of activities included (and not included) in them:²³

1. **Lack of consistency in terminology** – The reports do not use uniform language and present different events under different categories.
2. **Misclassification of Palestinian violence** – Violent actions by Palestinians against settlers are sometimes classified as actions of settler violence.
3. **Mislabeling acts of self-defense** – Instances of self-defense or responses to terror attacks or attempted attacks by Palestinians are labeled as settler violence.
4. **Racist double standard in defining violence** – Actions such as stone-throwing (without injuries), graffiti on walls, agricultural crimes, damage to state symbols, theft, or property arson are all counted—fully or partially—in IDF and police reports as Jewish violence, yet are not included in the Shin Bet’s monthly or annual reports on Palestinian terrorism.
5. **Including entirely non-violent acts** – For example, Jewish visits to the Temple Mount are listed as violent events in UN reports, as are government plans to expand settlements and neighborhoods in Jerusalem, plans to establish new Jewish communities, initiatives to adjust nature reserve boundaries and declare state land, demolition of illegal buildings, uprooting of unauthorized trees, and the establishment of checkpoints.

23 All claims will be substantiated by data and documentation provided below.

6. Highlighting violent acts perpetrated against Israeli security forces (mostly characteristic of Israeli reports reports). Although there are indeed acts of violence perpetrated by the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria that warrant criminal punishment, these are not acts of violence against Palestinians, which are the subject of the reports on settler violence.
7. Distorted or entirely fabricated incidents – Events that are either not supported by any evidence or, more than that, have been contradicted by opposing evidence.
8. **Circular reliance on unverified data** – The UN's OCHA website relies, among other sources, on data provided by various left-wing organizations, including B'Tselem and Yesh Din.²⁴ These organizations, in turn, base their claims on the OCHA website,²⁵ creating a circular logic that produces unreliable data that cannot serve as a valid basis for political arguments.
9. **Vague categorization** – The violent incidents range across a wide spectrum of severity—from spitting to murder—making it difficult to understand the true scope of the situation.


UN Data and Reports

In the pages below we will delve into the database upon which various organizations and countries base their reports—specifically, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) database.

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- 24 According to the OCHA Dashboard entitled Settler-related Violence, “information about settler-related incidents targeting Palestinians is collected from a variety of sources, including [Palestinian] municipal authorities, Palestinian District Coordination Offices (DCO), UN agencies, human rights organizations and media reports.” The full data set obtained by our researcher from UNOCHA lists the purportedly “independent and reliable sources” of information: Yesh Din, Peace Now, B'Tselem, the Palestinian Authority's various offices, including those under Hamas control in Gaza...
 - 25 For example, a report by Yesh Din titled Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the West Bank (<https://bit.ly/3SWrqP>), bases its findings on reports in Haaretz – which, in turn, are based on data provided by Yesh Din: The only other source to speak of is UNOCHA: “The data published in this report is based, among other sources, on OCHA's database of ‘Settler Violence’. In parallel, we transmit to OCHA the data we collect.” This indicates a pattern of circular use of unverified data.

The OCHA website includes a digital “dashboard,” listing four distinct categories: Palestinian Fatalities, Palestinian Injuries, Israeli Fatalities and Israeli Injuries. Within the Palestinian fatality and injury categories, a sub-filter enables viewers to identify a distinct category of perpetrators as “Settler-related Violence.”²⁶ This dashboard claims to present a database of incidents that occurred in Judea and Samaria, including East Jerusalem, involving Israeli civilians—either **as perpetrators or as victims**.

According to the website, the incidents include “acts of violence, intimidation, trespassing carried out by Israeli settlers and other Israeli civilians in the West Bank or against them,” and the determination of whether it is an incident against Palestinians or against Israeli settlers is based on the identity of the initiator.



The UN classifies the incidents according to their outcome:


Incidents resulting in fatalities or bodily harm that required medical treatment.

10. **Incidents resulting in property damage**, including all types of destruction, damage, vandalism to all types of property, theft of equipment, livestock and produce, as well as land seizure involving the leveling of cultivated land.

11. **Incidents that ended without damage or injury.**

According to the website, the sources of information on “settler violence” include

26 OCHA Dashboard, “Settler-related Violence” <https://www.ochaopt.org/page/settler-related-violence>



Palestinian municipal authorities, The Palestinian Office of Coordination (DOC), UN agencies, human rights organizations, and media reports. Additionally, according to the website, incidents against Palestinians are verified by at least two independent and reliable sources (a claim that will be refuted below).

One of the central sources is the extreme-left organization **B'Tselem**, as evidenced by a comparison between the UN's database and reports on B'Tselem's website.²⁷

On the aforementioned OCHA website page, titled **"Settler-related Violence"**, there is a link to a **database on casualties** (hereinafter: the **database**).²⁸ This

27 B'Tselem data on Palestinian, Israeli, and foreign civilian fatalities — those killed in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000. For example, regarding the year 2023, B'Tselem reports 14 Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians, whereas the OCHA report lists 15 such cases. For the year 2022, B'Tselem reports five Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians, whereas the OCHA report lists three cases.

28 The database is accessible at the following link: <https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties>

database is continuously updated in terms of numbers, without disclosing the details of the incidents it lists. Below, we will address this database.

The continuously updated database ostensibly presents the number of **Palestinians and Israelis killed or injured in incidents requiring medical treatment** as a result of violence in **Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem, and Gaza**. According to the explanatory notes on the database webpage, the count also includes those killed and injured in incidents related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that occurred within the boundaries of **“Little Israel”**²⁹ which involved **Palestinian Arabs from Judea and Samaria**.

Monitoring began in **2017**, and over time, the database has expanded, to include incidents from previous years going back to **2006**. The **UN database claims to distinguish** between violence against settlers, Israeli civilians and Palestinians.

The Database Definitions Undermine Its Credibility

The database, as presented on the website, suffers from serious credibility issues even before examining the specific cases:

1. The vast majority (98%–99%!) of the cases have no connection to civilians or settlers but rather involve confrontations with Israeli security forces.



Extreme leftist activists confront security forces

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- 29 A term used in Palestinian discourse to describe the territory of the State of Israel within the 1949 Armistice Lines (the “Green Line”), in contrast to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip. The use of the term seeks to distinguish between the different geographical-political areas in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Although the database is linked to a page titled “Settler-related Violence,” which suggests it tracks incidents involving settlers and Israeli civilians, in reality, the database of violence against Palestinians includes several categories of perpetrators: Disputed, Israeli civilian settler, Israeli forces, and Unknown. The overwhelming majority of the incidents listed in the database as “violence against Palestinians” are actually attributed to clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces. For example, between January 2008 and June 2024, only 0.8% of the incidents were attributed to settlers, while the rest involved confrontations with security forces or security operations against terrorism.

2. In an absurd twist, the database counts as victims of “settler violence” even **Palestinians who were harmed or killed during attacks and acts of terror that they themselves initiated and carried out against Israeli settlers**. The UN itself explicitly acknowledges this in the explanation of the various categories found below the database:

“Incidents involving Israeli settlers: includes attacks and alleged attacks by Israeli settlers, as well as incidents involving access prevention, and clashes following the entry of Israeli settlers into Palestinian communities. **It also includes Palestinians killed or injured during attacks or alleged attacks they perpetrated against Israeli settlers.**” (emphasis added)³⁰

For example, according to the database, in “settler-related incidents” that occurred in 2023, 19 Palestinians were killed — 16 in Judea and Samaria (West Bank), and three in “Little Israel” (i.e., within Israel’s pre-1967 borders). However, these figures do not reflect the stark reality that, according to data from the Shin Bet, 3,436 terror attacks were carried out in Israel in 2023, and at least 51 Palestinian terrorists were killed in the course of attacks they committed in Judea and Samaria — 19 of them attacks against civilians. An additional 13 Palestinian terrorists were killed in the course of attacks they themselves committed in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.³¹

30 <https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties>

31 Entry “Terror attacks against Israelis in Israel and the Territories in 2023” on Wikipedia, as well as biannual and monthly reports on the Shin Bet’s official website. Of the 51 terrorists killed in response to attacks they carried out in Judea and Samaria, the organizational affiliation of 46 is unknown — meaning they were ordinary Palestinian residents. Two others were Hamas operatives, and another three were members of the Palestinian Authority security forces.

For more on the involvement of Palestinian security personnel in terror attacks, see the Regavim report “Officers by Day, Terrorists by Night: Involvement of Palestinian Security Forces in Terrorism”, March 2024 (<https://bit.ly/3ThhTLt>).

Even the UN itself admits – and its own database proves – that some of those counted as victims are actually terrorists themselves. These figures are meaningless for two main reasons:

- a. It is possible that unknown numbers of “victims” were terrorists who carried out attacks in Judea and Samaria or in “Little Israel.”
- b. Since, according to the UN’s own statement, terrorists who were killed are also counted among the incidents of “settler violence,” and since the number of terrorists killed as reflected in the UN’s data (for 2023) is dramatically lower than the actual number of attacks that occurred in Israel that year in which the attackers were killed — the entire database is undermined and its credibility is called into question.³²

According to B’Tselem’s own data, **every Palestinian they recorded as having been killed by civilians in Judea and Samaria in 2022 was in fact killed as a result of either an attack or attempted attack carried out by that individual or by another Palestinian.**³³

3. **Another form of under-reporting** that undermines the credibility of the UN reports is that of incidents of Palestinian violence. A comparison between UN data and Israel’s General Security Service (familiarily known by the Hebrew acronyms **“Shin Bet” or “Shabak”**) **data**³⁴ regarding the number of **Israelis killed or injured** due to Palestinian violence between **2015 and 2023** reveals a consistent **undercount by the UN**. The **UN** report states that 149 Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorism during this period, whereas Shin Bet data puts the number at 172 Israeli fatalities. The same discrepancy applies to the number of injured Israelis: the UN reports 1,724 injuries during these years, whereas the Shin Bet reports 1,755.

32 Similarly, in 2022, the database lists three Palestinian fatalities in “settler-related incidents” or clashes in Judea and Samaria. According to Shin Bet data, in 2022 there were 2,163 attacks, and at least 36 Palestinian terrorists were killed in response to attacks they themselves carried out in Judea and Samaria, of whom 15 terrorists were killed in attacks against civilians. Additionally, at least ten more Palestinian terrorists were killed in response to attacks carried out in “Green Line” Israel. This means that, for that year as well, it can be understood that a significant portion of the Palestinians counted by the UN as fatalities in settler-related incidents in 2022 are actually Palestinian terrorists who carried out attacks themselves.

33 B’Tselem data on Palestinian, Israeli, and foreign civilian fatalities — killed in the context of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000.

34 General Security Service (“Shabak”) Annual Report, 2023.



Pro-Palestinian demonstrators ,anarchists and members of foreign organizations

More Holes Than Cheese – Analysis of UN Data

The list of incidents in the table at the core of the database we analyzed reveals numerous issues and difficulties that strip it of substance and undermine what remains of the credibility of the list and the database as a whole.

This list includes 8,332 “incidents involving Israeli settlers and other Israeli civilians” that occurred in the West Bank or in Israel (not in Gaza) between January 11, 2016, and April 30, 2023.³⁵

This list purports to present only incidents between Palestinians and Israeli civilians, and supposedly distinguishes between incidents of Israeli violence against Palestinians and Palestinian violence against Israelis. Later on, we will see that despite these claims, the list also includes incidents involving attacks on Israeli security forces.

In a long table, the list specifies for each incident the date, the district, the community (i.e., the village or neighborhood), the region (West Bank or Israel), and sometimes also a “special area” (such as Area C or East Jerusalem), and the name of the checkpoint where the incident took place. The list also enumerates the number of casualties in each incident, specifying whether they were Israeli or Palestinian, injured or killed, adults or children. Finally, the list provides a

35 Some of the data was presented by Dr. Michael Wolfowitz to the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee on 7 August 2024. See the recording of the committee hearing (Hebrew) and materials presented by Dr. Wolfowitz on the Knesset website: <https://bit.ly/4mD5uPD>.

description of the incident and identifies the sources of information. In the appendices to this report, one can find the categorization breakdown of the list and a more extensive analysis.

Even before delving deeply, the list contains several notable inaccuracies that cast doubt on its credibility. For example:

43 of the injured or killed individuals are attributed to incidents that were categorized as involving only property damage or no damage at all.³⁶

- **The subcategory “Attack or trespassing affecting Israelis, with no casualties or property damage” includes 46 incidents described as alleged settler violence against Palestinians,³⁷** which clearly should not be included in this category, thereby undermining the credibility of the classification—and, by extension, the credibility of the entire list.
- **The list includes at least two “incidents” involving rocket fire from the Gaza Strip toward Israeli territory.**
- **According to the list, 1,765 incidents classified as settler violence against Palestinians occurred in the “Israel” district, in the “East Jerusalem community” or in the “Jerusalem district.”** However, further examination of the specific community (i.e., village or neighborhood) where the incident allegedly took place reveals that **61 of these cases occurred in communities that are, in fact, located in the West Bank.³⁸**
- **Contrary to the UN’s Statement Regarding Source Cross-Checking and Reliance on At Least Two External Sources, the List Reveals a Different Reality.** About 1,000 incidents (12%) listed rely on only one source: The

36 The list includes a total of 8,366 injured and killed individuals. After removing incidents classified as having ended without damage or with only property damage, the list includes 8,323 injured and killed in total.

37 For example, incidents from the following dates: 24.4.2018; 29.4.2018; 26.7.2018; 3.5.2019; 24.5.2019; 1.5.2019; 23.10.2019; 4.12.2019 (visit to the Temple Mount); 27.1.2020; 28.1.2020; 9.1.2020; 30.1.2020 (Temple Mount); 2.2.2020; 3.2.2020; 10.2.2020; 11.2.2020; 12.2.2020; 13.2.2020; 16.2.2020; 17.2.2020; 27.2.2020 (Temple Mount); 1.3.2020 (Temple Mount); 2.3.2020 (Temple Mount); 24.3.2020; 14.4.2020; 29.7.2020; 11.10.2020; 18.10.2020; 20.11.2020; 15.12.2020; 4.1.2021; 6.2.2021; 22.6.2021; 5.7.2021; 29.8.2021; 30.5.2022; 19.7.2022; 14.8.2022; 19.11.2022; 27.11.2022; 9.12.2022; 28.1.2023; 15.2.2023; 19.2.2023; 25.2.2023.


38 According to the list, five incidents occurred in Al’Eizariya; three in Al Jib; three in Ar-Ram; two in Anata; one in Nabi Samuel; one in Khalayleh; one in Jabal al Baba; ten in Jaba’; five in Hizma; eleven in Beit Iksa; two in Khan al-Ahmar; two in Ma’azi Jaba’; ten in Mikhmas; one in Not Relevant (Mishor Adumim); one in Sharafat; and one in Qalandia.

sources cited as Pal DCL and DCO are simply two names for the same District Coordination and Liaison Office.³⁹ Similarly, UNDSS and UNRWA, which are the sole source for over 200 of the incidents, are departments or branches of the UN itself.

In addition, about 110 of these incidents are listed with **no source at all**.

- **There is a lack of correlation** between the number of injured and killed cited in the list—8,323 (7,621 Palestinians, 702 Jews)—and the number of injured and killed during the same period as reported in the database, which is 2,436 (1,152 Palestinians, 1,284 Jews), even though this number supposedly relies on the list itself, as shown in the graph below:

Casualties and Fatalities: The Database versus the Incident Reports



Both the list and the database, which claim to report on violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers/citizens against Arabs, include incidents in which the perpetrator is “security forces” as noted in preceding chapters above and detailed below.

39 As explicitly stated on the website Jerusalem Story (<https://www.jerusalemstory.com/en>), which presents the story of Jerusalem “through the lens of the Palestinian community in the city.”

The Forest and the Trees – Notable Examples of Distortions in UN Reports

The UN incident list we obtained distinguishes between 2,047 incidents of violence against Israelis and 6,285 incidents defined as violence against Palestinians, which will be addressed below. This number seems quite high, but once one delves into the list of incidents, the clear conclusion is that the vast majority do not describe violence related to settlers, and certainly do not describe violence initiated by settlers against Palestinians.

Among the 6,285 incidents of alleged violence against Palestinians that reportedly occurred between January 2016 and the end of April 2023:

1. **1,704 incidents (20%)** were classified as having occurred in the “Israel district” in the East Jerusalem community or in the Jerusalem district. In other words, they did not occur in the West Bank at all, and therefore have no inherent connection to “settler violence.”
2. **Of these, 1,361 incidents (approximately 16%)** were events involving Jewish ascents to the Temple Mount or Muslim riots on the Temple Mount involving confrontations with security forces—completely unrelated to any form of “settler violence.” It should be emphasized: every ascent to the Temple Mount is counted in the list as “settler violence.”
3. **1,613 incidents (about 19%)** of the incidents reported in the West Bank are general complaints, such as “entry onto land” during tours or hikes, which do not involve assault or harm to property or individuals.
4. An additional **96 cases** involve land use—often by the Israeli government or paid subcontractors on Israeli state lands—for the purpose of paving roads or laying infrastructure; in other words, legal actions undertaken by the State of Israel.
5. Another **2,039 incidents** (about 24%) in the West Bank describe complaints of assault or property damage **without bodily harm**. These cases should **not** be included in the UN’s updated database (since the list claims to include only cases involving bodily harm). In many cases, these involve clashes over agricultural issues on plots of land adjacent to Jewish communities.

After subtracting these cases, only 833 incidents remain, which the UN classified as settler violence against Palestinians in the Judea and Samaria, allegedly resulting in bodily harm and in some cases also property

damage. This constitutes only ten percent of the original list, which sought to reflect alarming levels of severe violence by settlers against Palestinians in the Judea and Samaria. Not only did this review cut 90% of the events, undermining the foundation of the UN's arguments and their consequences, but the remaining cases suffer not only from lack of credibility but also from a disgusting level of false accusation against the real victims.

These 833 alleged incidents occurred over approximately seven and a half years, averaging about **9.4 incidents per month**. According to the list, in **404 of these cases** (about 48%), "involvement in clashes" was recorded (i.e., a positive answer to the question Involved in clashes?), meaning cases where **both sides were involved** in these and other events, making it impossible to determine who initiated the incident.

Moreover, although the incident list purports to present incidents that occurred between Arab residents of Judea and Samaria and Israeli civilians, in **117 of the 833 incidents** the list's authors identified the perpetrator as "security forces,"⁴⁰ and in another **59 incidents**, perpetrators were defined by the list's authors as "security forces and settler civilians."⁴¹

After a thorough reading of every incident appearing on the list, **at least 96 additional** incidents were identified where complainants noted they were harmed by security forces.⁴²

Finally, examination of these cases⁴³ revealed that in many of them, it is not settler violence of one kind or another, but rather the opposite: these are terror attacks by Arabs against settlers that ended with the injury or elimination of the attacker. Below we present a few examples. We will show the description of the incident as it appears in the UN list alongside the facts as they actually are. References and a more detailed list of examples can be found in the appendices below.

40 "Military forces," "Israeli army," "Nonmilitary security forces". According to the incident list, 2,866 adults and 204 children were injured in these incidents, and 12 Palestinians were killed.

41 "Civilian-settler", "military forces". The list states that 1,083 adults and 94 children were injured, and on Palestinian was killed in these incidents.

42 In these incidents, 1,092 adults and 107 were reportedly injured, and 6 Palestinians were killed.

43 Also see Amit Segal's column in Yediot Aharonot, 30 December 2023, and his post on 1 February 2024; see Elhanan Gruner, "The UN counts terrorist attacks [against Jews] and visits to the Temple Mount as 'settler violence.'" HaKol HaYehudi, 4.1.24.

Incident Description per Report	Actual event details
18 May 2017	
<p>A 21-year-old Palestinian man was shot and killed by an Israeli settler, who also injured another Palestinian. The incident occurred during a demonstration in solidarity with Palestinians prisoners, in a section of Road 60, crossing the built up area of Huwwara village (Nablus). Video footage indicates that the settler ran over demonstrators who blocked his vehicle, following which, Palestinians threw stones at the vehicle and the settler opened fire. The Israeli Police announced that no investigation will be opened into this case.</p>	<p>Arab rioters blocked the vehicle of an Israeli traveling on the main road in Samaria, attacked the car, and smashed its windshield. The Israeli, whose vehicle was also blocked by a Palestinian ambulance, had no choice but to shoot in self-defense.</p> <p>One of the rioters was killed by the gunfire.</p>

Incident Description per Report	Actual event details
30 November 2017	
<p>One Palestinian man (48 years old) was shot and killed by an armed Israeli settler, reportedly from nearby settlement out post , while he was working in his land in area "C" in Qusra (Nablus). According to eyewitnesses, a group of 15 armed Israeli settlers entered the land of the farmer on foot and verbally clashed with the farmer when one of the settlers shot the farmer directly in the chest killing him instantly.</p> <p>After the incident, the Palestinians in village gathered and detained the Israeli settlers in a cave clashing with them, one of the armed settlers shot and injured a (35 years old) Palestinian. The body was on the way to Rafidia hospital when Israeli soldiers detained it at Huwwara CP.</p>	<p>A group of Israeli teenagers were hiking in the area and were attacked by dozens of Arabs who threw stones and rocks at them. One of the Arab assailants even grabbed the weapon of one of the Israeli escorts and threatened to shoot at the teenagers. The teenagers fled to a cave in the area and were later rescued by an IDF force. Two Israelis were injured. To protect the teenagers, one of the trip's security guards opened fire. As a result of the shooting, Muhammad Ze'al Oudeh, 47 years old, was killed.</p>

Incident Description per Report	Actual event details
7 February 2018	
18 YO Palestinian man was shot and injured with live ammunition by the security guard of Kharsina ettlement while he was working in his land with his family in Biet Enon near the settlement.	A Palestinian terrorist, Hamza Youssef Naaman al-Zama'ara, 19 years old from Halhul, arrived at the entrance to the settlement of Karmeit Zor and stabbed a security guard in the hand. Another security guard who was with him shot the terrorist and killed him. The terrorist had previously been arrested in 2015 and served 14 months in prison in Israel.

Incident Description per Report	Actual event details
25 June 2021	
One Palestinian man was injured after having been shot in the legs by Israeli settlers (or Israeli forces, still unclear which) at the entrance of the settlement of "Yitzhar", south of (Nablus), for allegations of attempting to stab a settler/soldier. According to local sources, the injured man suffers from mental instability. He is currently detained and hospitalized at an Israeli hospital.	A Palestinian terrorist armed with a knife infiltrated the Yitzhar community and was shot and wounded by Israeli security forces.

Incident Description per Report	Actual event details
25 February 2023	
According to Israeli media sources, one Palestinian was injured with live ammunition and arrested by Israeli forces after Palestinians reportedly threw Molotov Cocktails at Israeli settlers' vehicles traveling on road 443 near Beit Sira village (Ramallah). Reportedly, Israeli forces arrived at the scene and arrested one Palestinian after being injured. According to Palestinian local community sources, Israeli settlers fired live ammunition at Palestinians passing on road 443, Israeli forces then arrived at the scene and arrested one of the injured Palestinians. No clashes were reported.	According to the incident report on the UN website, this was unquestionably a terror attack in which a Palestinian threw incendiary "Molotov cocktails" – but the report memorializes the terrorist as a victim rather than properly classifying this as a case of Palestinian violence.

Additional incidents that were classified in the list as "settler violence," despite clearly not being such, include, for example, traffic accidents in which Arab residents of Judea and Samaria were injured,⁴⁴ the entry of hikers into archaeological sites in Samaria located on the outskirts of villages, and other absurd events—such as an Arab worker who was bitten by a dog in the settlement where he was employed.⁴⁵

As mentioned, there are also reports that were not verified or were verified by only a single source, and in addition at least some of them are patently false, as will be demonstrated below.

44 Such as incidents on the following dates: 16.9.2019; 28.5.2021; 22.3.2023.

45 An incident that occurred near Kfar Tapuah on 31.7.2017.

NEVERLAND: FABRICATED INCIDENTS

The following cases illustrate how falsehoods are fabricated out of thin air, and how the damage spreads without any connection to the facts. Some of these were mentioned above in reference to the UN report:⁴⁶

1. In 2021, U.S. Congressman Ro Khanna was interviewed on the major American television network NBC, claiming that Israelis were burning Palestinian villages. The claim was found to be completely unfounded. In reality, the event involved the removal of an illegal encampment called Khirbet Humsa, erected by Bedouin squatters in a military firing zone in the Jordan Valley. The encampment was removed by the IDF after receiving approval from the Israeli High Court of Justice (Bagatz).⁴⁷ The demolition was widely reported by B'Tselem, and subsequently by the Israeli daily Haaretz. The squatters returned at least twice, and the army removed them again and dismantled their tents. The case was covered with hostility in the French press and by Reuters, eventually making its way into the Congressman's remarks. After being confronted with the facts, the Congressman retracted his statement.
2. On May 5, 2021, the NGO B'Tselem posted a photo on X (formerly Twitter) showing a fire, along with the caption: "Settlers set fire to Palestinian fields in Burin last night." The Palestinian Authority's news agency WAFA published an identical report. However, already by the next morning, B'Tselem retracted and issued a press statement saying: "The fires in Burin last night are being re-examined. I will update with any new information." Even the director of Breaking the Silence admitted on Twitter: "There's a chance I was wrong and the ones who set the fires this time weren't settlers." Despite both organizations admitting their reports were false, the original tweets were never deleted and continued to serve as a false source for the "settler violence" campaign in the foreign media. Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib, known for her antisemitic remarks, used the false information and

46 Also see the debunking of B'Tselem's reports on the displacement of Palestinian communities at the hands of settlers after October 7th, and the names of the "Palestinian victims" mentioned in various reports that were actually killed while carrying out terror attacks against Jews or Israelis: Liel Leibowitz, "The Fraudulent Case Against 'Violent Settlers.'" Tablet Magazine, 8 February 2024 (<https://bit.ly/4kM6Eqx>).

47 Hana Amior, "The Pipeline" (Hebrew): <https://bit.ly/4coVo03> ; Se High Court of Justice case 3326/19- Yaser Mahamoud Muhammad abu Al Kabash et al. v The Israel Defense Force in Judea and Samaria, decision of 22 May 2019.

spread it further in her public statements.⁴⁸

3. In October 2023, the left-wing organization "Looking the Occupation in the Eye" reported: "Today settlers arrived and terrorists came to attack olive harvesters in the Taybeh area; the harvesters defended themselves. The attackers shouted 'attack' chants."⁴⁹ According to security forces' investigation on the ground, the Palestinians laid in wait for the Jewish shepherds, ambushed and attacked them, and then fled to the nearby village of Deir Jarir with a group of olive harvesters. Police collected evidence and testimonies, and complex investigative actions led to the identification and arrest of four Palestinian suspects from Deir Jarir — a father and his three sons. Eventually, the incident was re-cast as an allegation of an attempted murder of four Palestinians by "violent settlers."⁵⁰
 4. On September 3, 2024, the left-wing organization "B'Tselem" and journalist Gideon Levy published allegations by an Arab youth named Tarek Zubaidi, claiming that he came to have a picnic near the settlement of Homesh, where students from the Homesh yeshiva immediately hung him by his hands on a tree, burned his legs, and sprayed his face with tear gas. These allegations were widely published in the global media and were even discussed in UN institutions and European parliaments. However, these claims were refuted in court: footage of the youth in an Israeli army jeep with his eyes wide open disproved the claim that he had been sprayed with tear gas. A medical document from the Palestinian hospital dated the day of the event, which did not mention any burns, refuted the claim that Zubaidi's legs were burned. During an interrogation by the regional platoon commander, the youth admitted that he came to throw stones at the yeshiva students.⁵¹
 5. On January 22, 2025, the Municipal Security Officer of the city of Ariel was acquitted by the magistrate's court. He had been indicted and charged with assaulting a Palestinian on May 5, 2019, while assisting IDF forces
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- 48 Emanuel Miller, "Tlaib Shares Anti-Israel Smear after B'Tselem .Refuses to Retract Baseless Lie", HonestReporting, 6.5.2021 (<https://bit.ly/4joZJ5u>).
- 49 Posted on 26.10.2023 by 'Mistaclim laKibush Ba'Einyim' (Looking the Occupation in the Eye): <https://x.com/Mistaclim/status/1717489565609464050>
- 50 See Shiloh Freid, "The confrontation at the Rimoni Junction: Allegations of 'settler violence' give way to charges of attempted murder by 4 Palestinians." Makor Rishon, 23.11.2023.
- 51 Hanan Greenwood, "Honenu threatens to sue B'Tselem: Remove your false statement immediately." Yisrael Hayom, 3/9/2024; Case 38128-01-22 (Magistrates Court of Bat Yam) Cohen v Levy, judgement of 4.7.2024.



Olive grove set ablaze by anarchists and Palestinian activists

to evacuate a group of Arabs who clashed with the IDF during the olive harvest. The court ruled that the use of force by the security officer was justified under the circumstances, where one of the rioters attempted to seize a weapon from a soldier, and the use of force was intended to prevent an immediate and real danger and to thwart an active attempt to cause mortal harm.⁵²

52 See case 12613-07-22, The State of Israel v Algaz, Eyal; Avraham Bloch, "The man who prevented a soldier's weapon from being stolen – and was put on trial – is being exonerated: Breaking News," Maariv 29.1.2025.

Summary

In this chapter, we first reviewed the online database as it appears on the UN website alongside a detailed examination of the full data table underlying the aforementioned database.

1. The review demonstrated that the lists are not coherent with each other at all. There is an unexplained gap of hundreds of cases between the lists, which prevents the ability to relate to the data derived from either.
2. It was also shown that the vast majority of the cases counted and documented in the table/list are not related to any kind of violence but rather concern events such as visits to the Temple Mount, road construction, and more.
3. After filtering out thousands of irrelevant cases, only 10% remain from the original list, amounting to approximately 9.4 allegations per month of cases involving physical violence on a nationalistic basis.
4. Most outrageously, among these cases appear dozens of clear incidents of Arab terror attacks against Jews that were classified as "settler violence."
5. Additional data published from time to time contain various claims that are easily refuted after the public damage has already been done and echoed in Israel and around the world.

False Flags and Real Agendas

V. False Alarm? Israel Police and Security Forces Data



In previous chapters, we examined claims of settler violence based on the UN agencies' database and the underlying list, highlighting their internal inconsistencies and lack of reliability. We will now turn to examine the official databases of the State of Israel regarding incidents of nationalist-motivated violence in Judea and Samaria.

First, it is important to point out the fundamental failure that emerges from the arduous collection of data: three bodies in the State of Israel are responsible for what happens in Judea and Samaria — the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Israel Police, and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency).

Not only does none of these bodies officially publish the data they hold, but even after we gathered these materials, it became clear that every report issued from time to time by one of the authorities responsible for handling nationalist terrorism discloses partial and differing data, classifies data differently, and suffers from a marked lack of transparency.

If Israel is indeed dealing with a phenomenon of nationalist-motivated violence, there ought to be a shared database, a unified terminology, and a coordinated approach to all events occurring under this category.

Shin Bet (Israel's General Security Service)

In response to a Freedom of Information request submitted by the Regavim Movement to the Prime Minister's Office on December 1, 2024, we received the following answer:

"According to Section 14 of the Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998, the provisions of the law do not apply to the Shin Bet. Given the foregoing, we have decided not to comply with your request."

The lack of transparency on this issue does not allow for well-informed public discussion; as a result, the debate, which obviously continues regardless of the government's choice not to engage in it, is based almost entirely on generalizations and baseless statements. Under the veil of secrecy under which the organization operates, individual rights have been severely harmed in investigations of right-wing activists and settlers. Such a serious violation should only be legitimate given a real threat to the State of Israel. The concealment of data, which is apparently transparent to other organizations, places the justification for this violation in great doubt.

Israel Police Data

For the purpose of this research, Regavim submitted an official request to the

Israel Police to provide all the information in their possession, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Law (5758–1998), regarding all cases of crime and violence motivated by nationalism that occurred from 2014 to 2024 in the State of Israel. The information we received was classified by district and year, citizenship of suspects, number of investigation files opened, types of offenses investigated, findings of the investigations, their progression to indictment and conviction, and more.

The official and complete data from the Israel Police present a full factual picture and tell a story completely different from that presented by both the UN agencies and the media in Israel:

Between 2014 and 2024, a total of 537 investigation files were opened against suspects on the basis of Jewish nationalist-motivated crime in Judea and Samaria.

Examining Claims Regarding Under-Enforcement of Law Against Jewish Nationalist Violence

Left-wing organizations active in the field have claimed for years that the State of Israel does not enforce the law against Israeli citizens in Judea and Samaria. The organization “Yesh Din,” one of the leading campaigners against “settler violence,” presents in its reports issued to the public and funding bodies “data” tracking the process from filing the complaint through to the conclusion of the case, which supposedly supports their claim of under-enforcement.

However, a review of the report published on their website reveals that they do not possess the official data from the competent Israeli authorities, but only some cases they track and see as a sample of what happens on the ground. In their own words:

“The figures presented in this document do not conclude the results of all police investigations into allegations of such cases opened since 2005 and are limited to cases documented and monitored by Yesh Din. However, the data obtained by Yesh Din throughout the years in such files constitute an extensive and unique sample that enables an analysis of the way the Israel Police responds to ideologically motivated crime by Israelis against Palestinians in the West Bank.”⁵³

In other words, the organization selected the data it chose to present and drew conclusions that were convenient to present to the world. However, the official

53 Yesh Din, “Data Sheet: Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the West Bank (Settler Violence), 2005-2024,” p. 7. <https://bit.ly/3SWrqap>

data from the Israel Police, which provide the full picture, indicate a completely different reality:

The table below compares the data presented in the “Yesh Din” report with the police data received pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law for the purpose of this report, alongside official data from the State Prosecutor’s Office regarding the national average for handling police cases: cases that ended in indictment, cases that ended in conditional plea agreements, and cases closed without prosecution.

% of cases filed	Yesh Din report data	Israel Police data- FOI petition	State’s Attorney national data (2021)	State’s Attorney national data (2022)
Resulted in indictment	6.5%	9%	32%	28.5%
Conditional plea arrangement	0.1%	0.6%	2%	1.5%
Closed without charges	93%	81%	66%	70%

“Yesh Din,” the organization that published the data, argues, on the basis of these figures, that the low percentage of cases resulting in an indictment (6.5%) indicates a severe lack of law enforcement. However, official data provided by



Olive harvest :Palestinians accompanied by foreign anarchists

the Israel Police show that the actual rate of cases in which indictments were filed against Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria for ideologically motivated violent offenses is one and a half times higher than what is claimed by “Yesh Din.”

Between 2014 and 2024, a total of **1,356 cases of Jewish nationalist-motivated violence** were opened in the Judea and Samaria District, compared to **4,748 cases of Arab nationalist-motivated violence**. It is important to note the significant bias reflected in these figures: in the case of Jewish violence, the police handle all incidents, whereas in cases of Arab violence, many incidents are not handled by the police at all and remain classified as **nationalist terror incidents (טרור)** under the responsibility of the IDF. This is brought into focus in the huge gap between the number of Israel Police cases and IDF data on nationalist violence: according to IDF figures, **24,808** stone-throwing and Molotov cocktail incidents **alone** (excluding shootings, explosives, etc.) by Arabs against the Jewish population were recorded **between 2019 and 2022 alone**, compared to “only” **9,780 cases** of Arab nationalist violence recorded by the Israel Police in Judea and Samaria **over an entire decade**.

After clarifying the discrepancies in the figures, we now turn to a deeper analysis of the data presented by the police, in comparison to the data and claims made by the organization Yesh Din.

Reasons for Case Closures (%)	Yesh Din report	Israel Police data – nationalist crime (nationwide)	Israel Police data – Jewish nationalist crime (nationwide)	Israel Police data – Arab nationalist crime (nationwide)	Israel Police data – Jewish nationalist crime in Judea and Samaria	Israel Police data – Arab nationalist crime in Judea and Samaria
Circumstances Do Not Justify Prosecution (Lack of Public Interest)	3%	10%	10%	8%	8%	5%
Lack of evidence	18%	29%	20%	31%	19%	24%
Unknown perpetrator	65%	61%	68%	59%	72%	88%

For the purpose of data comparison, it is worth recalling that Yesh Din tracked 1,567 ‘selected’ cases over the course of about two decades, whereas the police data pertains to all cases from the past decade.

The data shows that regarding the comparison of **the grounds** for case closure (unknown perpetrator, lack of public interest, insufficient evidence, etc.), the percentages are similar across all districts with respect to nationalist crime in general. The distribution is also similar between nationalist-based violence in the Jewish and Arab sectors, in contrast to the data presented by “Yesh Din,” which clearly does not reflect the overall situation.

These similar figures clearly indicate equal police activity in terms of investigative capabilities, suspect identification, and summoning for questioning across all districts in the country.


Genuine Complaints vs. False Complaints

Another claim made by Yesh Din concerns the rate of complaint submissions by Arab victims of offenses in Judea and Samaria. According to Yesh Din, in 2024, 66% of Arab victims chose not to exercise their right to file a complaint against Israelis who had allegedly harmed them.

What this agenda-driven organization failed to do was to compare this data with general reporting rates throughout the State of Israel. In fact, according to an official report from the Knesset Research and Information Center, as of 2023, only about **26%** of all offenses are reported to the police—meaning that **74%** of victims do not file a complaint. Thus, the rate of complaints by Arabs in Judea and Samaria is **significantly higher** than what occurs elsewhere in the country.⁵⁴ The majority of the complaints, however, are false reports that do not lead to any substantive outcome. In other words, the high number of complaints is not necessarily a result of the allegedly violent nature of Jewish residents in the area, but rather a result of intensified activity by provocateurs and left-wing organizations, along with an active campaign of legal warfare.

As will be elaborated on in detail below, there is an extensive network of left-wing organizations operating in several capacities: documenting incidents and presenting them as Jewish violence, creating provocations in the field to generate incidents, filing complaints with the police, accompanying investigations, submitting appeals, and so forth. The left-wing organization Yesh Din, which raises funds under the pretext of needing to stop “settler violence,” presents the lack of indictments or the closure of most investigation

54 Data regarding reported crime in Israel: From the beginning of 2019 through the end of the Q3, 2024”. Knesset Research and Information Center.



files without conviction as evidence of selective enforcement—thereby casting aspersions on the conduct of the gatekeepers: the Israel Police, the State Prosecutor’s Office, and the courts.

The high rate of complaints by Arabs in Judea and Samaria regarding nationalist-based Jewish violence is thus explained by the existence of this well-oiled and generously funded system, which receives millions of shekels each year.

As shown in the table above, in 2024—the year of the Iron Swords War—the number of police cases opened for nationalist-related offenses doubled. Given the high rate of complaints by Arabs in Judea and Samaria compared to elsewhere in the country, as illustrated in the previous graph, it is clear that this increase does not necessarily indicate a real rise in the occurrence of offenses, but rather a surge in false complaints, as will be further detailed below.

In a Knesset discussion held on March 12, 2024, in the Subcommittee on Judea and Samaria Affairs, under the topic “Inciting Activity of Activists in Judea and Samaria”, Chief Superintendent Avishai Moalem, commander of the Judea and Samaria District’s Central Unit (responsible for investigating nationalist Jewish crime), stated: “Since the start of the war, there has been an increase in the number of cases and complaints from Palestinians and anarchists, with 191 cases opened—of which 90 turned out to be false complaints in the southern Hebron Hills area. Most of the complaints are orchestrated by radical left-wing organizations based in Tel Aviv, who report alleged violence by right-wing activists.” In the Jordan Valley region, there were 70 incidents—of which 50 percent also turned out to be false complaints.”⁵⁵ **In other words, according**

55 The Subcommittee for Judea and Samaria Affairs convened a hearing on ‘Provocations fomented by activists in Judea and Samaria,’ Knesset News 12.3.2024.

to official Israel Police data, 73% of the complaints filed during this period by left-wing and anarchist organizations were false. In the same session, Chief Superintendent Moalem also noted that since the beginning of the war, there had been a **50% drop** in nationalist-based crime.

The IDF corroborated similar findings, stating that following the outbreak of the “Iron Swords War,” there was a significant decrease in nationalist violence incidents in Judea and Samaria, and that many of the reports from left-wing organizations were found to be false.⁵⁶

In an interview conducted for this report with **retired Commissioner Shalom Katabi**, former commander of the Judea and Samaria District, the retired officer explained that many pieces of “evidence” that reach investigators come from the field as **left-wing activists intentionally provoke incidents, record everything, and edit the footage.** This results in many complaints being filed against Jews, but the truth revealed after collecting all the findings and testimonies on the ground uncovers a completely different picture. According to him, the Jews in the settlements and on the roads in Judea and Samaria are victims of terrorism of all kinds at all hours of the day. The low conviction rate clearly indicates a low number of offenses after the truth is uncovered in investigations.

The commissioner previously expressed his views on the matter and clarified how he sees things:

“The false claim about the phenomenon of settler violence is part of a campaign led by the Palestinian Authority and the BDS organizations aimed at harming the settlements and leading a delegitimization campaign against the State of Israel. Violence must be condemned in all its severity, but based on the Israel Police data from last November, where there were only 50 events in 2021 compared to nearly 100 such events during 2019, this is not a phenomenon but a direct continuation of the cynical incitement campaign against the settlements.”⁵⁷

Investigations that Result in Indictments and Convictions

The data from the Israel Police further shows that out of 537 investigation files opened regarding Jewish violence on a nationalistic basis in the Judea and Samaria district over the past decade, only 48 files matured into the filing of an

56 Ariel Kahana, “IDF confirms settler-perpetrated nationalistic crime drops drastically,” Yisrael Hayom, 26.12.2023 (<https://bit.ly/3Snmk7s>).

57 Shiloh Freid, “Former Judea and Samaria Regional Police Commander: Claims of settler violence – part of an anti-Zionist campaign.” 11.1.2022.



indictment. Of this number, 15 resulted in a conviction.

The data published annually by the State Prosecutor's Office regarding the scope of its activities indicates that the rate of investigation files transferred from the police to the prosecution and that matured into an indictment was 32% in 2021 and 28.5% in 2022.

	Jewish nationalist crime – Judea and Samaria	Jewish nationalist crime (nationwide)	Arab nationalist crime (nationwide)	Nationalist crime (nationwide)	State's Attorney data on all crime - 2021	State's attorney data on all crime - 2022
Number of indictments out of % of cases that led to investigation	9%	10%	3%	4%	32%	29%
	31%	36%	56%	50%	85%	86%

It's important to note that cases of Arab nationalist crime in Judea and Samaria are handled by the military prosecution and are therefore not reflected in this table.

The data presented in the table clearly indicate that cases of Jewish nationalist crime are not only **not** suffering from under-enforcement, as claimed by the left-wing organizations mentioned above, but the opposite is true:

1. **Three times as many indictments are filed for Jewish nationalist violent offenses than for Arab ones**, which indicates under-enforcement regarding Arab nationalist crime.
2. The data on Jewish nationalist violence in Judea and Samaria align with national trends, indicating that this is not a unique phenomenon specific to the region or its Jewish residents.
3. According to the Attorney General's report on nationwide crime, the conviction rate for all cases that proceed to indictment is approximately 85%. In contrast, the significantly lower conviction rate of around 50% for nationalist crimes—whether Jewish or Arab—suggests that these offenses have distinct characteristics. Therefore, efforts by organizations such as Yesh Din to present this data in a selective and context-free manner distort the broader reality and contribute to a pattern of misinformation.
4. Even at the relatively low conviction rate of about **50%** for nationalist offenses, the conviction rate for indictments filed against Jews for nationalist violence is significantly lower—**36%** nationwide compared to **56%** for Arab offenses—even though three times as many indictments are filed against Jews. This is further evidence of selective enforcement, specifically against Jews.
5. The **even lower conviction rate** of indictments filed against Jewish nationalist violence in Judea and Samaria, standing at **31%**, supports the statements of senior police officials cited above, explaining that this is an aggressive campaign by left-wing organizations responsible for the inflated number of complaints filed with the police.

Summary

Nationalist-motivated violent offenses have characteristics different from other criminal offenses. The distribution of reasons for case closures by the Israel Police is recorded in similar percentages across all districts regarding nationalist crime in general, with a similar rate between nationalist violence in both the Jewish and Arab sectors.

Left-wing organizations seek to explain the relatively low rates of indictments filed in these offenses by casting blame on the conduct of the prosecution and courts, claiming a lack of treatment and under-enforcement.



In reality, only about one-third (!) of the indictments filed against Jewish suspects are filed against Arab suspects in nationalist violent offenses, while the conviction rate of Jewish defendants in these offenses is significantly lower (15%–20%) than the conviction rate of Arab defendants in these offenses.


Consistent police data over the years prove that although left-wing organizations from Israel and abroad operate a whole system of paid workers who come to friction points (and even initiate frictions), equipped with event documentation equipment, followed by a system responsible for filing complaints and materials to the police, as well as a legal system for accompanying and monitoring these complaints, the rate of case closures remains similar to that in other districts across the country, where such an over-reporting system does not operate. This teaches us that the reality in Judea and Samaria is documented and investigated tenfold, creating a distorted picture, and without it, the complaint filing rates in Judea and Samaria would be even lower.

Especially egregious is the claim of under-enforcement regarding nationalist-motivated violent offenses committed by Jews in Judea and Samaria. Not only is this assertion false, but it is in fact the opposite of reality: enforcement against nationalist violence committed by Arabs against Jews across the country is significantly weaker than enforcement of similar offenses committed by Jews.

False Flags and Real Agendas

התקנים שנפתחו במשטרת ישראל מחצילת ינואר 2019
עד סוף ספטמבר 2024, לכל 1,000 נפש, לפי מרחב
משטרי

VI. Crime Data in Israel – A Comparative Overview



It is impossible to discuss the alleged violence by settlers without presenting and comparing it within a broader context of violence: both Palestinian violence and general criminal violence in Israel.

The extent of Jewish violence compared to Arab violence in Judea and Samaria

Since the State of Israel is the sovereign authority in Judea and Samaria, the power to enforce law is entrusted to it, and any violent activity by residents in the area is serious and must be combated. However, as shown by the breakdown presented above, these are a few dozen cases per year, most of which fall under the category of “property damage,” and only a minority under “physical harm.” Meanwhile, Arab terror attacks civilians, soldiers, women, and children, disrupt all aspects of life, and threaten every Jew living between the Jordan and the sea.

From the official data published by Israel’s security and rescue agencies regarding Arab terror, it is clear that the scope of nationalist-motivated violence by Jews is negligible compared to the extent and severity of Arab terror.

1. **Shin Bet data** on Arab violence in Judea and Samaria and inside the Green Line include only serious attacks, including shootings, throwing explosives (grenades, Molotov cocktails, etc.), stabbings, kidnappings, suicide attacks, ramming attacks, arson, and stone-throwing incidents involving medium to severe injuries.⁵⁸ The Shin Bet data do not include “lighter” attacks even when resulting in Israeli injuries, such as burning tires and arson, drone



58 See the monthly and annual reports published by the General Security Service on their website: <https://www.shabak.gov.il/en#=2>

bombs, incendiary balloons, targeted shooting of fireworks, dispersing road spikes, throwing paint bottles (which are recorded in police and IDF reports when allegedly thrown by Jews), blinding drivers with laser pointers, and carjackings. The Shin Bet data indicate that **6,068 serious attacks** occurred during 2020–2022.

- IDF data** on Arab terror in Judea and Samaria, which also includes stone-throwing, Molotov cocktails, shooting, and stabbing incidents as follows,⁵⁹ show an increasing number of attacks year after year. According to IDF data, **20,582 terror attacks** were carried out between 2020–2022.⁶⁰

The details are as follows:



59 The IDF's year: Data and Numbers, Judea and Samaria Region," IDF Website, 29.12.2022.

60 It should be noted that the Shin Bet has established a dedicated division to deal with Jewish terror, which mainly includes stone-throwing and property damage—incidents that are not even counted by this same law enforcement agency when they involve Arab terror.

3. Data provided by first-responder organization **“Rescuers Without Borders”** include attacks against Israeli civilians, assaults on settlements and damage to vehicles traveling on roads, as well as against security forces securing the routes (not including attacks on forces entering villages), from 2022 to the first half of 2024: **17,396 incidents**.⁶¹

It is clear that in the broader context, Jewish nationalist violence is a drop in the ocean compared to Arab violence.

“Settler Violence “in the Broader Context of Criminal Violence in Israel

This document does not focus on overall crime and victim statistics in Israel. However, for comparison purposes only, we present data from the Knesset Research and Information Center, which examined Israel Police files opened from the beginning of 2019 until the end of September 2024 and analyzed them by region and jurisdiction in which the crimes were committed.⁶²

Nationally, an average of 167 cases were opened per 1,000 residents during the examined period. Below is the number of cases opened per 1,000 residents, broken down by police district:

Eilat District – 443 cases per 1,000 residents.⁶³

Negev District – 282 cases per 1,000 residents.

Ayalon District – 253 cases per 1,000 residents.

Dan District – 105 cases per 1,000 residents.


Judea District – approximately 130 cases per 1,000 residents.

Samaria District – 102 cases per 1,000 residents. This was the lowest figure

61 “Rescuers Without Borders,” Summary of Terror Events January–June 2024; Summary of Terror Events in 2022, Rescuers Without Borders website, January 5, 2023; Rescuers Without Borders website, August 15, 2024; and data provided to us by the Rescuers Without Borders spokesperson.

62 Rami Schwartz, Collection of Data on Reported Crime in Israel: From the Beginning of 2019 to the Third Quarter of 2024, Knesset Research and Information Center, November 2024.

63 It is important to note that since Eilat is a tourist city, there is a discrepancy between the number of registered residents (on which the number of cases per thousand residents is based) and the actual number of people present in the city.



recorded in the study.⁶⁴

The map presents the distribution of police case files opened by the Israel Police from the beginning of January 2019 to the end of September 2024 per 1,000 residents, according to police districts.⁶⁵

There are additional aspects of the crime map in Israel, such as the number of tourists in Eilat and around Ben Gurion Airport, which create a distortion in the

64 These data are similar, and in fact nearly identical to those from a similar report sampled in the years 2017–2022: Roee Hershkowitz and Rami Schwartz, Collection of Data on Crime in Israel, Knesset Research and Information Center, February 6, 2023.

65 It should be noted that the data refer only to crimes reported to the police, whereas according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) survey, most crime victims in Israel do not report to the police. Additionally, the data refer to the location where the offense was committed, not to the origin of the suspect or the accused.

data when measured according to the number of registered residents in those areas. However, even when taking these factors into account, examining the map and the derived data clearly indicates that the Judea and Samaria region has an especially low crime rate per capita compared to other districts in the country.

Summary

In this chapter, we summarized our thorough review of all available reports—both foreign and official Israeli—on the phenomenon referred to as “settler violence.” The review and analysis of UN reports has clearly demonstrated that they are unreliable, inconsistent, lack transparency, and in no way present a complete picture.

The painstaking work of debunking the inflated figures was arduous but worthwhile, as it now fully reveals a clear and accurate picture.

Arab terrorism is counted as settler violence when it ends in the terrorist’s death or injury; the killing of terrorists by security forces is counted as settler violence; and even actions that are not violent at all—such as Jews ascending the Temple Mount—are recorded as settler violence. More gravely, events fabricated by Palestinians in Judea and Samaria or left-wing activists are also counted as settler violence, despite lacking even the slightest evidence—neither smoke nor fire—to support them.



A Jewish resident bears the mark of an anarchist attack



A B'Tselem activist participates in a provocation and ensuing clash in Har Hevron

The sources cited by the UN and others as if they were objective are unreliable, often presenting a single source as if it were two independent ones. While freedom of occupation allows left-wing organizations to earn a living by generating false claims and promoting them globally as settled facts, it is incumbent on every honest person—and certainly on the State of Israel—to examine the data as it truly is and not fall into the trap of deception.

Looking inward toward Israel itself: over the years, official bodies—IDF, Shin Bet, and the Israel Police—have failed to publish the true data in a transparent and measurable manner for the public and its representatives. This has prevented effective handling of existing violence and, more significantly, has aided left-wing organizations funded by foreign sources in disseminating unsupported and even falsified data without challenge.

The statements by senior police officials quoted above reflect a disgraceful trend of false complaints from left-wing organizations. Their goal is not to prevent nationalist violence—of any kind—but rather to smear the settlers and the entire State of Israel in the international arena. No decent person should accept this, especially in the broader context of thousands of Arab terror incidents each year, which disrupt the lives of settlers in Judea and Samaria and of Israeli citizens at large, and spread daily terror and death.

The analysis of police data showed that the enforcement and investigative authorities handle Jewish nationalist violence cases in Judea and Samaria in much the same way as they handle similar cases throughout the country. Furthermore, as shown above, the crime rate among the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria is significantly lower than in the rest of the country. Isolated incidents of violence are dealt with by police and the judicial system. However, framing the issue as “settler violence” reflects a political agenda and an attempt to dehumanize an entire public—nothing more.

False Flags and Real Agendas

VII. The Hole in the Boat: Ramifications of the 'Settler Violence' Campaign for the State of Israel



The Campaign's Implications in the International Arena

The libelous “settler violence” campaign is promoted by the Palestinian Authority⁶⁶ and by both Israeli and international left-wing organizations,⁶⁷ and it has severe practical consequences for developments within Israel—both from external and internal actors.

The implications of the delegitimization campaign against Jews in Judea and Samaria begin with harsh condemnations from around the world toward the State of Israel, continue with the use of this narrative to justify Palestinian terror in general—and the October 7 massacre in particular—and extend to unjustified, concrete sanctions against individuals and organizations with no connection whatsoever to violence. These sanctions unjustly harm national security, settlement activity, democracy, and human rights.

The Freezing of Arms Deals During the “Iron Swords” War

Following the October 7 attack, Israel decided to reinforce emergency response units throughout the country, including supplying them with firearms for self-defense. Some of these weapons were to be purchased from the United States, but the U.S. delayed the sales for months **“out of concern that the weapons would reach settlers.”**⁶⁸ The emergency response squads in the settlements

66 For example, a Facebook video from November 23, 2023, by Mahmoud Al-Habbash, advisor to PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), uses terms such as “escalation in systematic ethnic cleansing” and “colonialist apartheid regime” to describe “settler violence.”

67 For instance, in a BDS post dated December 13, 2022, terminology such as “ethnic cleansing escalation” and “executions in broad daylight” are used to describe settler violence.

68 Itamar Eichner, “The U.S. Delays Weapons Sale to Ben Gvir’s Emergency Squads; Israel to Procure Locally-Made Equipment for NIS 60 Million,” Ynet, January 21, 2024;

Barak Ravid, “Israel Pledged to the U.S. That Newly Purchased M16 Rifles Will Not Be Transferred to Settlements,” Walla, November 6, 2023;

“Skepticism Toward Settlers: U.S. Freezes Weapons Sale to Israel,” Srugim, December 13, 2023;

Elisha Ben Kimon, “The UN Endorses an Antisemitic Campaign: Allegations of Manipulation Surrounding Settler Violence Data,” Ynet, December 27, 2023.

are tasked with saving lives, and any delay in providing them with arms poses a tangible threat to the lives of residents—especially during wartime.

This issue represents a severe security failure and a serious consequence of the delegitimization campaign against the settlers, which could have cost human lives.

International Condemnations and the Cumulative Damage

Many countries, including some of Israel's allies, as well as major international bodies, continue to echo claims that bear no relation to the truth, causing severe and irreversible harm to Israel's foreign relations and diplomatic policy.

During his visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in December 2023, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Karim Khan, announced that he would investigate the horrific events in the area surrounding Gaza on October 7. The prosecutor is ostensibly obligated to investigate both sides of the conflict. Indeed, he promptly identified the other side of the "conflict"—the Simchat Torah massacre—and further announced his intention to investigate so-called "settler violence" in "the West Bank."⁶⁹

Similarly, just one week after the horrifying massacre in the Gaza envelope, a delegation from the European Union visited Israel and toured the villages of Huwara and Burin, from which many terrorists had emerged. Instead of condemning Hamas's terrible massacre, senior EU officials addressed the local residents with speeches against "settler violence" and condemned Israel. Leaders of the G7 nations (the organization of industrialized countries, including the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) likewise condemned the increase in violence by extremist settlers against Palestinians.⁷⁰

In countries that have adopted the narrative and acted upon it against the State of Israel, one can list Egypt, whose President al-Sisi criticized the international community's silence regarding the "unjustified" settler violence in "the West Bank,"⁷¹; Jordan, which warned against "the continued settler violence in Judea

69 Itamar Eichner, "The Hague Prosecutor Announces at the End of His First Visit to Israel: 'I Will Investigate Settler Violence in the West Bank,'" Ynet, December 3, 2023.

70 "EU Representatives in Huwara: 'The Settlements Are an Obstacle to the Establishment of a Palestinian State,'" Hakol Hayehudi, December 13, 2023; Hagar Shezaf, "Gallant Signed an Administrative Detention Order Against a Settler Suspected of Attacking Palestinians," Haaretz, December 26, 2023.

71 See Arabi21 on Facebook, 22.1.2023.

and Samaria";⁷² Canada, which "condemns the violence by extremist settlers in the West Bank,"⁷³ and Germany, which stated that "Netanyahu must condemn settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank."⁷⁴

Of course, we cannot forget the United States under President Biden, which joined the chorus of accusations through a variety of senior officials, beginning with the spokesperson for the State Department, who condemned "unprecedented levels of violence by extremist settlers against Palestinians and their property, and the displacement of entire communities";⁷⁵ continuing with then-Vice President Kamala Harris's remarks about the need to hold extremist settlers accountable for acts of violence;⁷⁶ and statements by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations at the time, who said the United States was "deeply concerned about the sharp rise in violence against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank. We condemn these killings and call on Israel to prevent these attacks in coordination with the Palestinian Authority"; and culminating in then-President Biden's own warning that violent settlers were "pouring fuel on the fire."⁷⁷

It is worth noting that a primary source of information for U.S. government institutions and President Biden regarding "settler violence" is General Michael Fenzel, the U.S. Security Coordinator between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Fenzel regularly briefs, among others, members of Congress, policymakers in Washington, and representatives of foreign governments in Israel. He circulates frequent updates—sometimes daily—about alleged actions by violent settlers against defenseless Palestinians, allegedly under the protection of the IDF and with the encouragement of the Netanyahu government. Although his position is meant to be objective and impartial, almost every claim Fenzel presents as fact regarding "settler violence" originates directly—and at times word for word, without independent verification—from overtly pro-Palestinian sources. These include, notably, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which, as previously noted, draws its information from Israeli left-wing organizations, primarily B'Tselem

72 Operation Iron Swords (Situation Report Updated to 1 p.m., 28 February 2024), The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (<https://bit.ly/3FfdM1>).

73 News from Radio Canada, 19.12.2023.

74 Facebook page of the Turkish media channel TRT, 22.11.2023.

75 David M. Weinberg, "The myth of escalating settler violence," The Jerusalem Post 9.12.2023 (<https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-777150>)

76 As reported by Anna Bresky, Maariv Online, 8.11.2023.

77 Itamar Eichner, Elisha Ben Kimon and Einav Halabi, "US: Concerned by the significant rise in violence against Palestinians in the West Bank," Ynet 31.10.2023.



and Yesh Din.⁷⁸ As demonstrated above, these sources are unreliable and certainly cannot serve as a basis for imposing sanctions on Israelis.

Foreign media and networks, in turn, also echo the false narrative—whether in the form of “news reporting”⁷⁹ or through uncritical acceptance and repetition of unsubstantiated accusations.⁸⁰

Even Massacre Can Be Justified – Reactions in the Arab World

In direct continuation of this, the Arab world exploits the delegitimization

78 Liel Leibowitz, *ibid*.

79 For example, a video by the Al Arabiya channel from Dubai dated November 21, 2023, which claimed that five clusters of Arab communities in the West Bank were evacuated due to settler violence.

80 For example, a post by French journalist Piny Deng on December 4, 2023, quoting the UN as saying that since the war in Gaza, settler attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank have doubled; a post by AL24news, the international channel of Algeria, from November 25, 2023, presenting a video of EU President Ursula von der Leyen under the headline: “The European Union calls to stop settler violence in the West Bank.”

campaign to justify all use of terror, including the horrific massacre of October 7. Such were, for example, the words of the King of Jordan on November 22, 2023: "Violence by extremist settlers in Israel could lead to a serious escalation of the conflict, and the situation in the West Bank is out of control."⁸¹

On November 23, 2023, the Al Arabiya news channel broadcast remarks by the advisor to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas: "The violence of armed settlers in the West Bank against Palestinians will explode the situation and lead to an attack greater than that of October 7."⁸²

What One Lie Can Do – The Precedent of Sanctions in Israel

In early December 2023, despite an Israeli document presented to the Biden Administration asserting that incidents of violence against Palestinians had actually decreased since the beginning of the war, the United States announced that it would restrict the entry of settlers accused of violence against Palestinians into U.S. territory.⁸³

Immediately thereafter, **EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell** announced that he would propose EU member states impose sanctions on settlers responsible for violence against Palestinians, including entry bans to the EU. A week later, **the United Kingdom** announced a similar ban on "those responsible for settler violence against Palestinians" from entering its territory.⁸⁴ **Canada** also announced that it would impose sanctions on "violent settlers."

In early February 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden signed **Executive Order 14115**. This order targeted not only settlers proven or accused of violence, but was broadly defined in its title as applying to individuals **"undermining peace, security, and stability in the West Bank."**

In the order, **Biden declared** that settler violence poses an "extraordinary and unusual threat" to the **national security and foreign policy of the United**

81 A publication by the Jordanian news company Manchette on Facebook, November 22, 2023; a publication by the media and TV channel RT Arabic.

82 Facebook <https://bit.ly/4j0wGpk>.

83 Barak Ravid, "The US has begun to cancel visas for settlers on the black list." Walla, 5.12.2023.

84 Itamar Eichner, "The UK bars 'those responsible for settler violence against Palestinians' from entering British territory." Ynet, 14.12.2023.

States, and that the executive order was intended to address that threat.⁸⁵

Shortly after the executive order was issued, the U.S. Administration imposed sanctions on four Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria whom it claimed were involved in acts of violence. Subsequently, the United Kingdom imposed economic sanctions on four Israelis (one of whom was also among those sanctioned by the U.S.), and France imposed sanctions on 28. The Czech Republic and Hungary tried unsuccessfully to block efforts by EU institutions to impose similar sanctions on Israelis.⁸⁶

The imposition of sanctions means freezing the assets of individuals and corporations, prohibiting any business transactions with sanctioned entities, and banning their entry into the country imposing the sanctions. In practical terms, this means that any entity tied to the American financial system—including all banks and financial institutions in Israel—may not provide any business or financial service to sanctioned individuals, whether it be a checking account or a crowdfunding campaign.⁸⁷

Under Biden's Executive Order, the definition of those subject to sanctions was **extremely broad**, applying not only to those involved in violence or threats of violence against civilians and their property, but also to **anyone deemed "responsible for, complicit in, conducting, or attempting to conduct—directly or indirectly—activities** that threaten peace, security, or stability in the West Bank." This included **"intent, legislation, implementation, enforcement, or failure to enforce"**—and even **anyone, anywhere, who provides support** to such individuals.

85 The opening statement of the Executive Order stated that "the situation in the West Bank-in particular high levels of extremist settler violence, forced displacement of people and villages, and property destruction-has reached intolerable levels and constitutes a serious threat to the peace, security, and stability of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and the broader Middle East region. These actions undermine the foreign policy objectives of the United States." https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/2024-02/eo_14115.pdf

86 Professor Amichai Cohen, "The sanctions against Israelis: Ramifications and significance for Israel, The Israel Democracy Institute, 21.2.2024(<https://en.idi.org.il/articles/52991>); Zoe Grunewald, "UK imposes sanctions on four Israelis over 'human rights abuses' towards Palestinians ." The Independent, 12.2.2024; French Foreign Ministry, "France adopts sanctions against violent Israeli settlers." 13.2.2024.

87 Uri Blau: "U.S. to Expand Sanctions on Far-Right Extremists and Settler Groups, Senior State Dept. Official Says." Shomrim, 29.7.2024 (<https://www.shomrim.news/eng/u-s-to-expand-sanctions-on-far-right-extremists-and-settler-groups>)

Indeed, the U.S. Administration quickly expanded the order and applied it to people and organizations who had no connection whatsoever to “settler violence”, and in some cases, no connection to Judea and Samaria at all.

After the initial sanctions on the first four settlers, the U.S. administration imposed additional sanctions every few weeks. What began as sanctions against individuals, most of whom were unknown to the general public, and later against owners of agricultural farms, developed into sanctions targeting those considered far-right figures, such as Bentzi Gopstein and Baruch Marzel—even though they were never charged with violence.⁸⁸ From there, sanctions extended to the grassroots protest organization “**Tzav 9**”⁸⁹ and its leaders, Reut Ben Haim and Shlomo Sarid,⁹⁰ on the grounds that their activists blocked supply trucks to Gaza—despite the fact that their protest was against aid falling into Hamas hands and in demand that humanitarian aid be conditioned on the release of hostages.

The Americans also imposed sanctions on the financial funds “**Har Hebron**” and “**Shalom Asiraich**”, which had assisted in raising funds for the settlers targeted by the previous sanctions. As a result, these organizations’ livelihoods were cut off, and they were accused of violating the prior round of sanctions.⁹¹

The U.S. took things further by imposing **sanctions on Elor Azaria and his family**, barring their entry into the United States. As recalled, in 2016, while serving as a soldier, Azaria was convicted of killing a neutralized terrorist during a terror attack in Hebron. Although he was tried in Israel, demoted to private, and served a prison sentence, the U.S. administration imposed sanctions on him and his family as “a further step in promoting accountability for serious human rights abuses, and following actions that undermine peace, security, and stability in the West Bank,” according to the State Department’s statement.⁹²

Canada, not to be upstaged, announced sanctions “against Israelis defined as

88 Simon Lewis, “U.S. sanctions ally of Israeli minister, fundraisers over settlers.” Reuters, 20.4.2024.

89 Nadav Shragai, “Tzav 9 deserves praise, not punishment.” Israel Hayom 20.6.2024 (<https://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/tzav-9-deserves-praise-not-punishment/>)

90 Itamar Eichner, Gilad Cohen, “US sanctions mother of 8 heading Gaza aid protest and misidentified individual.” Ynet, 7/11/2024 (<https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjgfosp0>)

91 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2281>

92 “US sanctions former IDF soldier Elor Azaria who killed wounded Palestinian assailant.” Ynet 17.7.2024.

perpetrators of violence and extremist settlers,” including Bentzi Gopstein and the Lehava movement, the Amana settlement movement and its head **Zeev Hever (Zambish)**, as well as **Daniella Weiss**, who has never been charged with violence but is associated with promoting and institutionalizing settlement in Samaria.⁹³

Canada also took action against the **Jewish National Fund (JNF)**, one of Israel’s national institutions, and against the **Samuel Neaman Institute**, which operates at the Technion in Haifa and conducts national policy research. Canada revoked their status as tax-exempt charities following complaints from pro-Palestinian organizations about their activities in Judea and Samaria.⁹⁴ As if that were not enough, Japan jumped on the bandwagon, declaring sanctions against “four violent settlers.”⁹⁵

The Biden Administration also considered imposing sanctions on Israeli Finance Minister **Bezalel Smotrich** and National Security Minister **Itamar Ben Gvir**⁹⁶ due to their political positions, as well as **on five IDF units**, including the **Netzah Yehuda Battalion**.⁹⁷ Subsequently, **the United States threatened—and eventually imposed—sanctions on the Amana Movement**, which builds and develops Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria.⁹⁸ Another attempt was made to impose sanctions on the **The Regavim Movement**, on the grounds that it had petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court against a school built illegally with European funding—a petition that led to a court ruling ordering the dismantling of the illegal structure.⁹⁹

93 David Israel, “Canada sanctions Daniella Weiss, 79, for ‘Extremist Violence.’ The Jewish Press, 28 June 2024. <https://bit.ly/3HD2dzM>.

94 Michael Starr, “Canada revoking JNF Canada charitable status, JNF says motive antisemitic.” The Jerusalem Post, 27 July 2024. <https://bit.ly/3HnHksu>

95 Itamar Eichner, “Japan to impose sanctions on Israeli settlers.” Ynet, 21.7.2024. <https://bit.ly/4dORn5R>

96 Barak Ravid, “White House discussed sanctioning Israeli ministers over settler violence.” Axios, 20.7.2024. <https://bit.ly/447TxJF>

97 Israel Hayom, “Israel decries US plan to sanction IDF unit.” 21.4.2024. <https://bit.ly/4kPp5dV>

98 Uri Blau, “U.S. to Expand Sanctions on Far-Right Extremists and Settler Groups, Senior State Dept. Official Says.” Shomrim – The Center for Media and Democracy, 29.7.2024. <https://bit.ly/3FLoeff> . Barak Ravid, “U.S. sanctions companies that build settlements in occupied West Bank.” Axios, 18.11.2024. <https://bit.ly/4jzPbk8> .

99 Sara Ha’etzni-Cohen, “Sanctions must be met with sanctions.” Israel Hayom, 22.7.2024. <https://bit.ly/3T4WCVo>

Thus, we see that the U.S. Administration, followed by other democratic countries, exploit the “settler violence” narrative as a pretext for imposing harsh sanctions - or threatening to impose them - on individuals and organizations, most of whom have never been accused of any involvement in violence or criminal activity. Innocent Israeli citizens found themselves suddenly helpless, unable to buy bread and milk for their families or receive their salary from their workplace. This represents a severe infringement on individual freedom, as well as a blatant violation of the State of Israel’s democracy and sovereignty. Additionally, it constitutes gross interference in Israel’s domestic and foreign policy, and a maligning of the Israeli judicial system and the gatekeepers of Israeli democracy.

It should be noted that in the first day of Donald Trump’s second term as President of the United States, Executive Order 14115 was effectively revoked, and the lifting of restrictions began to move through bureaucratic channels. However, the damage caused is irreversible—both because of the European sanctions that have yet to be lifted (and which, as noted, followed the U.S. lead), and because of the precedent created, in which nothing now prevents future U.S. Administrations or other countries from accusing any Israeli—including senior IDF officers, Knesset members, ministers, and even the prime minister—of any allegation they see fit, despite the fact that such actions would be a gross interference in Israeli democracy and are an attempt to topple the democratically-elected government.

Antisemites in judicial robes: providing a tailwind for biased International Court of Justice decisions

On July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague issued a harsh advisory opinion against the State of Israel, regarding the “illegality of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.” One of the court’s claims was as follows: “Israel’s settlement policy gave rise to settler violence against Palestinians,” and furthermore, “Settler violence—and Israel’s failure to prevent or prosecute it—has created a hostile environment for Palestinians. Israel’s systemic failure to prevent or punish settler violence against Palestinians, as well as its excessive use of force against Palestinians, violates its obligations.”¹⁰⁰

Thus, the “settler violence” campaign enabled the Court to base its arguments on a false and unfounded narrative.

100 Elisha Ben Kimon and Itamar Eichner, “Israeli officials concerned over diplomatic implications of ICJ ruling,” Ynet, 20.7.2024 (<https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjkrfefor>).

The Campaign's Impact Within Israeli Society

The “settler violence” campaign has had serious practical consequences within Israel, including actions by domestic actors. These range from the echoing of the narrative by Israelis themselves, to the increased use of administrative orders for arrests and movement restrictions, and even to conceptual distortions in the judicial system and unequal law enforcement.

Seemingly, senior security officials and political leaders understand well that this is a false accusation: on December 17, 2023, Prime Minister Netanyahu confronted an American advisor regarding the “settler violence” issue and attacked the campaign. In a government meeting he stated:

“There are parties here who are simply defaming the settlers, and this must be addressed. There is no increase in these incidents; that is evident even in the Shin Bet’s data. This is simply a campaign against this dear public. If there are any cases—they are very isolated.”¹⁰¹

Even earlier, on December 5, 2023, in response to the American intention to impose sanctions on settlers, then-Minister Benny Gantz demanded: “Do not use the term ‘settler violence’—it does not represent the residents of Judea and Samaria.”¹⁰²

Former Central Command Commander Maj. Gen. Yehuda Fox also clarified in November 2023: “There is no such concept as ‘settler violence.’”¹⁰³ By December 2023, the Central Command acknowledged that many incidents reported by left-wing activists as ‘settler attacks’ were proven false, and in fact, there was a drastic decline in nationalist Jewish violence in Judea and Samaria.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, even Maj. Gen. Fox himself eventually succumbed to the false claims and used his farewell speech from his position to accuse settler leaders of not doing enough to eliminate phenomena that he had previously claimed did not exist. His speech caused damage and joined the harmful “I accuse”

101 Ariel Kahana on X, 17.12.2023.

102 Sivan Hilaie, “Gantz: ‘Term settler violence does not represent residents of West Bank.’ Ynet, 12.5.2023 (<https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b10vxbpb6>).

103 “Under fire again: Who is Yehuda Fox and why are people furious with him?” Maariv Online, 6.2.2024; David Israel, “Central Command Chief: No Such Thing as ‘Settler Violence.’ Jewish Press Online, 16.11.2023.

104 Ariel Kahana, “IDF confirms settler-perpetrated nationalistic crime drops drastically.” Israel Hayom 26.12.2023



campaign, which harms the State of Israel no less than it harms the settlement enterprise.¹⁰⁵

Referring to “settler violence” in January 2024, then Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated that the number of violent incidents was significantly declining, and that settler involvement in such events was only partial—this does not characterize the settlement movement in any way.¹⁰⁶ In a closed hearing of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee held on February 28, 2024, an IDF representative clarified: “There is no such thing as ‘settler violence,’” and “these are isolated incidents.”¹⁰⁷

However, it seems that the heads of the political and security establishments have not fully internalized the severe consequences of the narrative and the campaign surrounding settler violence, and insufficient efforts have been made, both nationally and internationally, to counter it. **Due to the ongoing absence of an official Israeli response, a vacuum has been created, allowing the narrative to flourish based on unofficial, random, and false data.**

105 Zvi Bar’el, “Israeli Settler Terrorism is State Terror Against Palestinians,” Haaretz, 5.7.2024.

106 Itay Blumenthal and Suleiman Masouda, “Gallant warns: Judea and Samaria may ignite; the Palestinian Authority is an Israeli interest,” Kan, 14.1.2024.

107 Meirav Arad, “IDF representative on settler violence: ‘There is no such thing, these are isolated incidents,’” News1, 28.2.2024.

Auto-Antisemitism Disguised as a Campaign

A particularly outrageous fashion among certain far-left elements within the State of Israel justified the horrific October 7 massacre by invoking “settler violence.” Member of Knesset Ofer Cassif gave an interview to a U.S. radio station two weeks after the massacre, in which he claimed that violent settlers were the reason Hamas attacked on October 7, and that had action been taken against the settlers, the massacre could have been prevented.¹⁰⁸

Other politicians and security officials have fallen prey to the “settler violence” campaign and amplify the false narrative. For example, in 2021 Nitzan Horowitz, Mossi Raz, and Osama Saadi initiated (or participated in) a Knesset conference on “settler violence.”¹⁰⁹ In a meeting of the inner War Cabinet in October 2023, immediately after the outbreak of the devastating war ignited by Hamas and other Palestinian actors, and while the IDF was operating at full force, Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi saw fit to blame settler violence for the escalating unrest in the area.¹¹⁰

Harm to Individual Freedoms

There is no dispute that administrative orders—for arrest, distancing, confiscation of weapons, and so on—are extreme and anti-democratic tools that gravely harm fundamental rights. For example, in a court ruling, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein, stated: “It bears repeating that administrative detention in itself is a harsh and severe measure, and its use places a special duty of scrutiny on the judicial authorities... It must be remembered that ‘there is no justification for such a severe violation of human liberty unless it is to prevent a real danger to public security.’”¹¹¹

Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant signed 23 administrative detention orders in the period between the formation of the current government in December 2022 and August 2024—comparable to the total number of

108 Yishai Friedman on X, 19.12.2023.

109 Elisha Ben Kimon, “Record-braking Jewish terrorism: Controversial Knesset conference against settler violence,” Ynet 22.11.2021; Arik Bender, “Settler Violence Live: Ben Gvir bursts into conference and raises an uproar,” Maariv 22.11.2021.

110 Or so claimed Itamar Eichner, Elisha Ben Kimon and Einav Halabi, “US: Concerned by the significant surge in violence against Palestinians in the [West] Bank,” Ynet 31.10.2023.

111 HCJ 6845/05, Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria v Judge in the Military Court Appeals Court for Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

administrative detention orders issued against right-wing activists and settlers from the founding of the State until 2022.¹¹² When Minister Katz entered office as Defense Minister, he decided to change this policy and refuse to surrender to the pressure created by the delegitimization apparatus. Minister Katz emphasized, of course, that enforcement and punishment mechanisms would continue as usual in cases of suspected criminal activity, but that the improper and sweeping use of administrative orders would be discontinued.¹¹³

The Vanguard: The Organizations Leading the Campaign

As previously noted, the “settler violence” narrative is, in fact, an operational, planned, coordinated, and organized campaign. In 2005, the left-wing organization mentioned earlier, Yesh Din, was established. According to its own statements, it collects testimonies from Palestinians about “settler violence” and works toward law enforcement in such cases.¹¹⁴ The organization B’Tselem also claims to present data on settler violence since 2005. A short time later, in 2008, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) began publishing its own data. It is important to note that Yesh Din, for example, bases its fundraising appeals on this very campaign. That is, the more extreme (and false) data they present to the public, the more donations they are likely to receive. This is clearly visible in the pop-up ads displayed to visitors on their website.

As detailed above, this organization goes even further, **publishing distorted and unfounded claims about how enforcement authorities handle such cases.**

Joining these organizations, which are actively working to create and maintain the “settler violence” narrative, are other Israeli left-wing organizations, international organizations, and the Palestinian Authority, as outlined below:

- **Radical Left-Wing Organizations:** Around twenty left-wing organizations operate across Judea and Samaria, presenting themselves as “human rights organizations” working for the humanitarian needs of Palestinians and to end the “occupation”.

112 Abigail Zeit, “The 18-Year-Old Administrative Detainee Was Released from Prison – and Immediately Received a New Order”, Makor Rishon, August 27, 2024.

113 Natan Galula, “Katz announces end to administrative arrest of Israeli citizens.” JNS, 24.11.2024.

114 <https://www.yesh-din.org/en/>



Palestinians and foreign activists clash with Israeli security forces

- These are **militant organizations** that actively seek to **create provocations and anarchy**, and to **document them**—including within the IDF itself.¹¹⁵ Their activities **explicitly involve violence**, such as **throwing stones at settlers and soldiers**, with the aim of provoking a forceful reaction from settlers or military personnel in the area. These organizations even testify about their own role in forwarding complaints and information to law enforcement agencies. For example: “In some of the investigation files included in Yesh Din’s sample, the organization’s team had to assist the investigative authorities in performing their duties. Among other things, Yesh Din acts as a mediator between police investigators and Palestinian crime victims, accompanies witnesses to police stations, and even locates and submits relevant documents and photos to the investigative units.”¹¹⁶
- **International organizations and foreign countries**, including the European Union, are involved in this campaign through three main channels, which will be detailed further below:
 - A. Fundraising and financing of the campaign and field activities.
 - B. Creating provocations and documentation via activists sent from abroad, who enter Israel disguised as tourists or pilgrims. In order to avoid damaging their reputation or jeopardizing foreign funding,

115 Or for example: Noam Amir, “The Breaking the Silence Campaign Worries the Defense Establishment”, Makor Rishon, February 16, 2022.

116 “Law Enforcement on Israeli Citizens in the West Bank (Settler Violence)”, Yesh Din, Data Sheet, 16.1.2025.



Yesh Din in action

in most cases, these organizations' representatives do not engage in violence themselves, but rather cynically use local Arabs, and encourage them to carry out these actions.

- C. International propaganda through prominent foreign organizations such as ISM, the International Solidarity Movement, and the American organization "Center for Jewish Nonviolence".
- From the **Palestinian Authority** side, the campaign is managed by Palestinian activists and by the **Commission Against the Wall and Settlements**,¹¹⁷ a government body established by the Palestinian Authority in 2014 and headed by Minister Muayyad Shaaban.¹¹⁸ This commission coordinates the struggle against Jewish settlement and is responsible

117 "Research Report: Organized Takeover Under the Palestinian Authority, with the Aid of Left-Wing Organizations: This Is How the Body Behind the Organized Arab Takeover in Judea and Samaria Operates", HaKol HaYehudi, The Struggle for Every Dunam, August 2022.

118 This commission submits reports to the Palestinian Cabinet, as stated on the official website of the Palestinian Authority: <https://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/portal/OrgStructure/Details/57> .

for encouraging and organizing provocations and violent attacks against Israeli security forces and Jewish communities. Minister Shaaban himself openly promotes and leads acts of terror¹¹⁹ and has even been documented vandalizing and burning property belonging to a Jewish-owned farm.¹²⁰ The Commission Against the Wall and Settlements claims to document and track incidents of violence and publishes exaggerated, absurd, and false reports. For example, on July 2, 2024, the Commission's website quoted Minister Shaaban as saying: "The Israeli occupation and colonialist forces committed **7,681 attacks** in the first half of 2024." A quick glance at the kinds of activities he listed as "attacks" makes the fabrication evident. Among the actions counted as such were: Dozens of plans to expand settlements and neighborhoods in Jerusalem; plans to establish Jewish communities; boundary adjustments for nature reserves; registration of Israeli state land; demolition of illegal structures; uprooting of trees and other unpermitted agricultural projects; installation of security checkpoints.¹²¹ The clear correspondence between the minister's list and the actions later classified in UN reports as 'settler violence' is unmistakable.

Among the foreign organizations leading the organized provocations on the ground, the most prominent are:

- **International Solidarity Movement (ISM):** The organization's activists come from abroad for set periods in order to create provocations and violent confrontations in the field on a daily basis. They are housed in apartments owned by the organization in Ramallah and Hebron. During the training provided to volunteers, they are taught that they are expected to document IDF soldiers openly during operations, and to make it clear that they are being filmed; the intent is to harass and intimidate the soldiers. They are trained to "serve as "a protective presence in homes allegedly under attack by soldiers or settlers; to be physically present in towns where the demolition of illegal buildings is expected; and, most importantly: to share their stories and testimonies on social media and in the press, to give interviews and lectures in their home countries. According to the organization's website, the only thing a volunteer is required to bring in order to participate is a mobile phone with a camera, or a separate camera, to record what is happening."¹²²

119 See the YouTube video, "Who are you, Minister Sha'aban?"

120 "In broad daylight: PA minister sets Jewish property ablaze," Kikar Hashabbat, 4.8.2023.

121 Website of the Wall and Settlements Resistance Committee, <https://www.cwrc.ps/>

122 See the organization's website: <https://palsolidarity.org/join/>



- **Center for Jewish Nonviolence** – An American organization that sends delegations of Jewish activists from North America, Canada, and the UK to the field, primarily to the South Hebron Hills and East Jerusalem.¹²³
- **IWPS** – A European organization that sends European female activists to Israel who describe themselves as “peace and human rights activists,” but in practice operate in Samaria with open support for terrorists and participate in riots and olive harvest provocations.¹²⁴

In addition to the organizations already mentioned – **Yesh Din**, **Peace Now**, and **B’Tselem** – there are other Israeli left-wing organizations whose activists are present in the field on a daily basis and are well-funded:

- **“Looking the Occupation in the Eye”** – An organization that sends anarchist activists primarily to the Jordan Valley region to “accompany shepherds” and collect data for presentation to the organization, which in

123 See their website: <https://cjin.org/>.

124 Elhanan Gruner, “Peace activists or terrorists’ supporters? Meet the women of IWPS – Investigation.” Hakol HaYehudi 15.3.2023. https://www.hakolhayehudi.co.il/item/english/peace_activists_or_terrorists%E2%80%99supporters_meet_the_women_of_iwps_-_investigation



turn transfers it to the International Criminal Court in The Hague and other UN institutions. In practice, this involves uploading videos with commentary that is far removed from reality, along with false posts on social media, aimed at harming settlers and security forces.¹²⁵

- **Torat Tzedek** – An organization founded by Arik Ascherman, a far-left activist who previously served as the president of the left-wing organization Rabbis for Human Rights. Ascherman and his group, along with Palestinian activists, engage in provocation and incitement in the Binyamin region, harassing shepherds and dragging both sides into violent acts — including against him.¹²⁶

125 In a video published on June 13, 2024, a foreign activist named Andrei boasts of a tangible “victory over the settlers” because they managed to get two youths arrested after their vehicle was forced off the road. He ends the post with the words: “The settlers, the police, and the army are all part of the same colonial settlement project.” These statements illustrate the overarching goal of the organization: to delegitimize the State of Israel — including its security forces and settlement enterprise alike. <https://bit.ly/3RFarJz>.

126 See Wikipedia page on Arik Ascherman and references 9–10 cited there. The following video, posted on the same webpage, was uploaded by the far-left organization “Looking the Occupation in the Eye.” The video is outrageously labeled, “Arik Ascherman in a confrontation with a hilltop youth who entered a private Palestinian field in the village of Al-Mughayyir and tried to steal water. April

2024." In reality, there is neither indication nor evidence that this is a Palestinian field. What the footage clearly shows is a provocation by Arik Ascherman, who forcibly shuts off the faucet on a young Jewish shepherd trying to water his flock. It is clear how Ascherman and his fellow cameraman provoke the young shepherd to act violently until the shepherd is forced to leave the area with his herd. <https://bit.ly/4i4btth>

False Flags and Real Agendas

VII. The Money Trail and the Agenda's Route



The “settler violence” campaign serves, among other things, the goal of advancing the delegitimization of Israeli control in Judea and Samaria and aims to promote the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is funded by supporters of this idea — foreign governments, including the previous U.S. administration, European countries, the European Union, and a series of foreign organizations — with an annual budget of millions of dollars.

At the end of 2019, the European Union awarded a grant of **NIS 1,180,000** (out of a total budget for this project of approximately **NIS 1,480,000**) to two Israeli organizations leading the 2020–2021 campaign — B’Tselem and Breaking the Silence — under the project title, **“A Symbiotic Relationship in the West Bank: Holding Israeli Authorities Accountable for Settler Violence.”** The stated aim of the project was “to increase accountability by providing strategic and objective information and analysis regarding settler violence to key stakeholders in order to enhance respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.” With these funds, B’Tselem and Breaking the Silence “documented” more than 450 “incidents” of “settler violence.” The materials they produced received sweeping international media coverage and significantly amplified the settler violence campaign.¹²⁷ This report thoroughly refuted the supposed “objectivity” stated in the project’s objective and that ostensibly justified the massive sums transferred to the organizations.

However, the budget for this particular aspect of the campaign is just a drop in these organizations’ massive money pool. According to its quarterly reports to the Israeli Registrar of Nonprofits, B’Tselem received **NIS 46,258,659** from foreign state entities between 2012–2020. To this amount, add donations from other human rights organizations, church-affiliated groups, and private foundations, such as the New Israel Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation.¹²⁸ The very last sentence in the extensive “Settler Violence = State Violence” campaign page on B’Tselem’s website states: **“This publication was produced with the assistance of the European Union. B’Tselem is solely responsible for its content, which does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.”** In other words, the EU provides the funds, and B’Tselem is responsible for the content.

According to its quarterly reports to the Registrar of Nonprofits, Breaking the Silence received **31,642,017 shekels** from foreign state entities between

127 NGO MONITOR, 21.10.2020; Akiva Van Koningsveld, “It’s Time For A Fact-based Conversation About Israeli

‘Settler Violence.’ HonestReporting, 24.11.2021 <https://bit.ly/4lopWTY>” .

128 For an in-depth survey of B’Tselem’s funding and activities, see NGO Monitor’s page: https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/b_tselem/

2012–2021. In addition, it received donations from human rights organizations and private foundations such as the **New Israel Fund** and the **Rockefeller Foundation**.

In **2019 alone**, the year in which it launched the “settler violence” campaign, Breaking the Silence declared income of **\$10 million dollars**, **60%** of which came from foreign state entities.¹²⁹ According to an October 2021 report, the European Union transferred **NIS 1 million** to Breaking the Silence for a designated “settler violence” campaign, which was used in part for massive outdoor signage and the production of a booklet of testimonies alleging settler violence.¹³⁰

The United Nations also allocates budgets to “deal with” settler violence. For example, in 2017 and 2020, the UN granted Médecins du Monde \$348,322 and \$1,077,573, respectively, for a project aimed at “mitigating the effects of conflict-related violations (settler violence, demolitions, excessive military use of force, displacement) on mental health” through emotional and psychological support, community resilience, and awareness-raising.¹³¹ **Naturally, justifying such massive budgets requires ‘proving’ the existence of settler violence — even if it means inventing it out of thin air.**

In 2021, the UN granted several Palestinian organizations (including Al-Haq and Al-Mezan) **\$194,255** for a three-month project focusing on advocacy, monitoring, and documentation of human rights violations, including settler violence.¹³²

Thus, the open and ongoing transfer of millions of shekels over the years, alongside covert massive funding, serves as undeniable evidence of the extensive efforts made by foreign entities to manufacture and entrench the “settler violence” narrative out of thin air.

129 For full details of Breaking the funding and activities, see NGO Monitor’s website.

130 Gidon Dukov, “The European Union grants NIS 1 million for a campaign against ‘settler violence’ (Hebrew),” Makor Rishon 24.10.2021.

131 <https://fts.unocha.org/plans/529/projects> ; <https://fts.unocha.org/plans/832/projects> ; <https://bit.ly/4j1BMS>

132 <https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1049/projects>, <https://bit.ly/4cuHHwY>

False Flags and Real Agendas

VIII. Summary and Recommendations



Summary

For many years, the “settler violence” campaign—deliberately framed in absolute terms—has taken a prominent place in both Israeli and international public discourse. Its primary and ongoing goal has been to **delegitimize the State of Israel** in general and **Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria** in particular. This is part of a broader anti-Israel initiative aimed at generating international pressure on Israel, harming the settlement enterprise, and promoting the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In the words of British author **Sir Arthur Conan Doyle**: “It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly, one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.”

Conan Doyle’s apt observation is generous toward those behind this influence campaign, for their actions were not a mistake or in good faith—but rather intentional and deliberate. As is typical of a campaign, it combined multiple channels and actors, each contributing their part to the cause. At first, its Israeli left-wing leaders focused on disproportionately inflating numerically insignificant events in order to suggest the very existence of this alleged phenomenon. Later, additional organizations were established with the declared purpose of documenting friction incidents, filing complaints with law enforcement, and engaging in legal action—alongside flooding the media with such events. The scarcity of actual cases soon led these and other groups to actively create provocations with Israeli security forces and Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria—thus “generating” new incidents themselves.

The **Palestinian Authority** also played a part by fabricating provocations and friction points, inventing false claims, and flooding them into international forums like the UN and foreign governments opposed to Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria—relying on “data” from Israeli organizations acting in similar ways.

Campaign organizers further claimed that Israeli law enforcement was not acting against this “phenomenon” and that additional financial resources were needed to “protect” against it.

The pooling of such resources, in turn, led to a feedback loop of falsehoods: Campaign leaders—both in the Palestinian Authority and among Israeli left-wing organizations—had to prove to donor countries that this was indeed a broad, violent, and cruel phenomenon. So, they threw everything imaginable into the pot: The fact that thousands of events, most entirely unrelated to violence, and many occurring outside of Judea and Samaria, were labeled “settler violence”, is eerily parallel to Hamas’s murderous logic in claiming

that residents of Kibbutz Be’eri and Kfar Aza are “settlers”—or to the absurd declarations of the official Palestinian news agency, which reported on “settler roadblocks” in Tel Aviv in protest of the Netanyahu-led right-wing government.

The absurdity only deepened as Arab terror attacks were counted as “settler violence”—if they ended with the terrorist being killed or injured. Even the IDF killing of terrorists during operations or thwarted attacks was labeled as settler violence. Fabricated events—which a basic check proves never happened—as well as thousands of peaceful visits by Jews to the Temple Mount or official government actions such as land declarations, settlement planning, or nature reserve designations were all included in these “databases”. These grew to encompass thousands of so-called “settler violence” incidents.

The flames of this manufactured fire grew higher and higher—artificially stoked—but with real, damaging consequences: International condemnations against Israel, use of the false narrative to justify Palestinian terror, including the October 7 massacre, damage to international relations and blocked defense deals, support for biased, anti-Israel decisions in international forums like the UN and the International Criminal Court in The Hague - even personal economic sanctions by friendly nations against Israeli individuals and entities—without any legal or factual justification.

In the spirit of Conan Doyle’s words, the problem was exponentially worsened by Israel’s failure to confront the campaign, and its failure to take even the most basic, obvious step: verifying the data. In fact, Israel contributed to the falsehood by neglecting to create a unified, official, and transparent database on the actual scope of ideologically motivated crimes—both by Jews and by Arabs. With such data—alongside proportionate framing and factual context—it would have been easy to debunk the campaign at much earlier stages.

Israel’s lack of official data gave tailwind to this false theory, and some within Israel even adopted it. What began in the Israeli public as a concern over fringe extremism has now snowballed into a threat to Israel’s very sovereignty, its democratic integrity, and its independence as a nation-state.

This report does not seek to deny the existence of violence in certain parts of the State of Israel or within the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria. However, a meaningful discussion is impossible when one cannot separate the wheat from the chaff. A handful of genuine cases—like any legal violation—require treatment, but they are indistinguishably lumped together with thousands of other cases that have nothing at all to do with violence. The very act of conflating them proves that what is truly on the table is a delegitimization campaign filled with both overt and covert agendas.

Winston Churchill, one of the greatest statesmen of the modern world, once said: “Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened.”

We were unequivocal in our belief that the State of Israel cannot afford to ignore the truth. That is why we conducted a thorough investigation into the allegations, repeatedly examined the relevant data, and meticulously analyzed the findings—determined to uncover the core facts and make them accessible to the public.

This study was conducted and written throughout the year 2024, during which time disproportionate sanctions against individuals, NGOs, and organizations accelerated in pace, and was sent to print a few months after the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, who rescinded the executive order imposed by his predecessor, Joe Biden.

Despite this unprecedented and welcome shift in the new American administration’s stance and its strong support for Israel, this is no cause for complacency. Sanctions from European countries have not yet been lifted. Moreover, even before any change in policy, the campaign had already set a dangerous precedent: that nothing prevents foreign governments—even those friendly to Israel—from accusing any Israeli they choose, with any claim they deem fit. This includes senior IDF officers, Members of Knesset, ministers, and even the Prime Minister himself—a grave interference in Israeli democracy and an attempt to destabilize its government.

The collaboration between Israeli left-wing organizations and global left-wing bodies—which aim to undermine Israel’s sovereignty, whether by leveraging UN institutions or by blocking arms deals and issuing condemnations during wartime—is deeply troubling and raises difficult questions.

We are confident that the State of Israel is capable of responding resolutely to this severe modern-day blood libel, of dispersing the falsehood, and of mobilizing resources both to end the defamation and to effectively address genuine criminal activity in all relevant areas.



Recommendations

The primary recommendation of the authors of this report is the unification of the databases of the police and law enforcement authorities regarding crime in Israel of all types, which could lead to an objective assessment and comparative analysis of the data between different regions within Israel and globally.

Consolidating this information will, in a relatively short time, allow for the credible dissemination of factual data and will enable the derivation of a wide range of rehabilitation and preventive actions to curb the ongoing spread of falsehoods:

- **A proactive Israeli public diplomacy campaign** – the creation of **international information platforms** that present the truth about violence in Judea and Samaria, including visual materials, interviews, and testimonies that expose the manipulations of anti-Israel organizations. This should be accompanied by diplomatic efforts with friendly nations to bolster Israel's position on this issue and more broadly.
- **Enhancement of the law enforcement and judicial system** – addressing nationalist crimes while also tackling false complaints, and penalizing those who fabricate misleading narratives, which unjustifiably burden enforcement systems, undermine justice, and ultimately harm the State of Israel and its citizens.
- **Expulsion of hostile elements** – outlawing foreign entities operating in Israel against the state and its citizens, such as OCHA and others, in a manner similar to the legislation that ended UNRWA's operations within Israeli territory.
- **Continued comparative research** – evaluating similar types of crime worldwide in order to better understand the scope and proportions of the phenomenon.
- **Legislation to prevent delegitimization** – conducting a thorough investigation of the funding and connections of organizations involved in the delegitimization campaign, and advancing legislation that would impose a heavy tax on foreign state funding to Israeli organizations engaged in efforts to delegitimize the State of Israel.

False Flags and Real Agendas

Appendices



Appendix 1: Analysis of the UN Incident List Claimed to Underpin OCHA's Database

The incidents in the list are classified into **nine subcategories**, as follows:

1. 191 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass resulting in Israeli casualty."
2. 275 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass resulting in Israeli casualty AND property damage."
3. 914 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass resulting in Israeli property damage."
4. 667 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass affecting Israelis NOT resulting in casualty or property damage."

These incidents mostly describe Arab violence against Jews ,such as stone throwing ,Molotov cocktails ,paint bottles ,explosive devices ,fireworks, stabbings and attempted stabbings ,gunfire at communities or vehicles ,tire burnings ,and even two cases of rocket fire from Gaza into Israel.

5. 607 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass resulting in Palestinian casualty."
6. 316 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass resulting in Palestinian casualty AND property damage."
7. 2,157 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass resulting in Palestinian property damage."
8. 7 incidents were classified as "Takeover of Palestinian property."
8. 3,108 incidents were classified as "Attack/trespass affecting Palestinians NOT resulting in casualty or property damage."

Sub-category		Incidents of Palestinian violence against Israelis		Incidents of Israeli violence against Palestinians		Total number of incidents
Casualties	Physical injury only	191	TOTAL: 466	607	923	
	Physical and property damage	275		316		
Property	Property damage only	914		2,157		
				97	Expropriation of Palestinian property	
No casualties or damage	667		3,108			
TOTAL						8,322

Appendix 2: Comparison Between the Number of Fatalities and Injuries in the Incident List and the Number in the Database

As previously mentioned, the list in question purports to present incidents that occurred between **West Bank Arabs and Israeli civilians**. However, we analyzed the cases in which Arabs were injured or killed in the West Bank and found **117 incidents** that were classified in the list as incidents where the perpetrator was **Israeli security forces** (and not civilians, as the list's title claims). In these incidents, 3,070 Palestinians were injured and 12 were killed. Additionally, a deeper look into the general database revealed another 96 incidents in which the perpetrator was security forces, resulting in 1,199 injuries and 6 fatalities among Palestinians.

However, according to the dataset for the relevant period (January 11, 2016 – April 30, 2023), 2,436 Palestinians were injured by Israeli civilians, either intentionally or during mutual clashes.

Palestinian fatalities (by settlers or in disputes): 23 in the West Bank + 1 in Israel. **Total: 24** according to the incident list, compared to **50** in the same list (or **32** after excluding those likely killed by security forces). See Screenshot 1.

Palestinian injuries: 1,109 in the West Bank (1,101 reportedly by Israeli civilians, 8 in disputes) + 19 in Israel (by Israeli civilians), for a total of **1,128**, compared to **7,571** Palestinian injuries in the incident list, or **3,302** after subtracting those apparently injured by Israeli security forces — **three times the actual number**. See Screenshot 2.



Israeli fatalities: 70 in the West Bank (43 civilians + 23 from security forces), 32 in Israel (30 civilians + 2 from security forces), totaling **102** Israeli fatalities in the database, **compared to 51** in the incident list. See Screenshot 3.

Israelis injured by Palestinians: 945 in the West Bank (578 civilians + 367 security personnel), 237 in Israel (219 civilians + 18 security personnel), for a total of **1,182** Israeli injuries, **compared to 651** in the incident list. See Screenshot 4.




Screenshot 1: Palestinians fatalities.

Top: 23 In the West Bank. Bottom: 1 In Israel.




Screenshot 2: Injured Palestinians.


Top: In the West Bank, by Israeli civilians. Middle: In the West Bank during a dispute. Bottom: In Israel, by civilians.




Screenshot 3: Israeli fatalities. Image 1: 43 civilian fatalities in the West Bank



Screenshot 3: Israeli fatalities. Image 2: 27 security forces fatalities in the West Bank



Screenshot 3: Israeli fatalities: 30 civilian fatalities in Israel



Screenshot 3: Israeli fatalities. Image 4: Security forces fatalities in Israel

Appendix 3 – Comparison of Events as Listed by the UN vs. Reality

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
17 May 2017	
<p>A 19-year-old Palestinian man was injured with live ammunition fired by an Israeli settler near Silwad village. According to local sources, a group of Palestinians were gathering to block Road 60 near the village in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners on hunger strike in Israeli jails; an Israeli settler stopped his car and shot towards the protestors, injuring the Palestinian man. The injured man was arrested by Israeli soldiers who intervened and fired tear gas canisters and rubber bullets towards Palestinians. Three other Palestinians were also arrested. Many cases of tear gas inhalation were also reported (Ramallah)</p>	<p>Terrorists threw rocks at vehicles on Route 60. During defensive fire by a passenger, one of them was injured. This incident too was classified as “settler violence,” despite clearly being an act of self-defense against Palestinian violence.</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
18 May 2017	
<p>A 21-year-old Palestinian man was shot and killed by an Israeli settler, who also injured another Palestinian. The incident occurred during a demonstration in solidarity with Palestinians prisoners, in a section of Road 60, crossing the built up area of Huwwara village (Nablus). Video footage indicates that the settler ran over demonstrators who blocked his vehicle, following which, Palestinians threw stones at the vehicle and the settler opened fire. The Israeli Police announced that no investigation will be opened into this case</p>	<p>Arab rioters blocked the car of an Israeli driving on the main road in Samaria, attacked the vehicle, and shattered its windshield. The Israeli, whose car was also blocked by a Palestinian ambulance, had no choice but to open fire in self-defense. One of the rioters was killed by the gunfire.</p>

30 November 2017	
<p>One Palestinian man (48 years old) was shot and killed by an armed Israeli settler, reportedly from nearby settlement outpost , while he was working in his land in area "C" in Qusra (Nablus). According to eyewitnesses, a group of 15 armed Israeli settlers entered the land of the farmer on foot and verbally clashed with the farmer when one of the settlers shot the farmer directly in the chest killing him instantly. After the incident, the Palestinians in village gathered and detained the Israeli settlers in a cave clashing with them, one of the armed settlers shot and injured a (35 years old) Palestinian. The body was on the way to Rafidia hospital when Israeli soldiers detained it at Huwwara CP.</p>	<p>On November 30, 2017, a group of young Israeli hikers was attacked near the village of Qusra (near Nablus) by dozens of Palestinians who threw stones and rocks at them. One of the Palestinians grabbed a weapon from one of the group's security guards and threatened to shoot at the young Israelis. The Israelis fled to a nearby cave and were later rescued by the IDF. Two Israelis were wounded. In response to the attack one of the adults accompanying the trip opened fire, killing Muhammad Z'al Awda, 47.</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
7 February 2018	
<p>18 year old Palestinian man was shot and injured with live ammunition by the security guard of Kharsina settlement while he was working in his land with his family in Beit Anoun near the settlement.</p>	<p>Before dawn on February 7, 2018, a Palestinian terrorist, Hamze Yusuf N'aman al-Zama'ra, 19, from Halhul (near Hebron arrived at the entrance of the community of Karmei Tsur in Gush Etzion and stabbed a security guard in the arm. The guard was not seriously wounded. Another security guard, who was present at the time, shot and killed the stabber. Following the attack, IDF forces entered the village of Halhul and interrogated family members of the terrorist. Palestinians rioted and threw stones at the IDF forces. One of the rioters was detained.</p> <p>Al-Zama'ra, detained in 2015, had spent 14 months in detention in Israel (Ma'an, February 7, 2018).</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
8 April 2018	
<p>A 30-year-old Palestinian man was shot and injured with live ammunition by an Israeli settler allegedly for attempting to stab another Israeli settler at the entrance of Mishor Adumim industrial area. The Palestinian was identified as Mohammed Abdul Karim Marshoud from Balata refugee camp. He was seriously injured and transported to hospital under custody. No other injuries were reported (Jerusalem).</p>	<p>Muhammad Abd al-Karim Marshoud attempted to stab Israeli civilians in Mishor Adumim. He was neutralized by an Israeli civilian, injured, and died the following day. The incident was classified as “settler violence” even though it was a case of self-defense against Palestinian violence. The UN went even further and reported this incident a second time on April 9, when the assailant died from his injuries. In the UN’s display of absurdity, his injury was recorded as “settler violence” and his death as “Palestinian violence.”</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
3 April 2019	
<p>One Palestinian was shot and died later in hospital and another one was injured when two armed Israeli settlers opened fires for two times towards Palestinian who was reportedly throwing stones towards Israeli passing cars at road "60" near Beita junction. One of the throwing stones hit an Israeli car, whose driver stopped and shot several times at the Palestinian who got injured directly, before another Israeli car "truck" reached and stopped to join in shooting another several bullets together with the first settler. The killed Palestinian succumbed to his wounds later, the other Palestinian who injured wasn't involved in throwing stones, he was just working inside his auto repair shop, which located in the area. No Israeli injuries were reported. It is worth to mention that Israeli media published that the Palestinian shot and killed by an armed Israeli settler after he suspected tried to carry out a stabbing attack at Beita junction near Nablus.</p>	<p>A terrorist attempted to stab an Israeli driver who was traveling with his daughter on the main road in Samaria and got stuck in traffic near Huwara. In self-defense, he was forced to shoot the attacker. Whether the Palestinian who was killed had thrown stones, as per the UN's version, or attempted a stabbing attack, he was killed as a result of self-defense against Palestinian violence. This incident, too, should have been classified by the UN as "Palestinian violence against Israelis."</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
4 April 2019	
<p>Israeli settlers reportedly from Mevo Dotan settlement physically assaulted a Palestinian child (16 years old) in Ya'bad village (Jenin), allegedly after he tried to throwing stones towards them</p>	<p>Even according to the description of the incident itself, the "assault on the Palestinian" was an act of self-defense after the Palestinian tried to throw stones at the Israeli residents. This incident, too, should have been classified as "Palestinian violence."</p>
25 June 2021	
<p>One Palestinian man was injured after having been shot in the legs by Israeli settlers (or Israeli forces, still unclear which) at the entrance of the settlement of "Yitzhar" south of (Nablus), for allegations of attempting to stab a settler/soldier. According to local sources, the injured man suffers from mental instability. He is currently detained and hospitalized at an Israeli hospital.</p>	<p>A Palestinian terrorist armed with a knife infiltrated the Yitzhar community and was shot by security forces.</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
3 July 2021	
<p>One Palestinian (21 years old) was shot in the chest with live ammunition during clashes erupted when group of Israeli settlers raided the village of Qusra, south of (Nablus), while backed by Israeli forces. According to local sources, the deceased was on the rooftop of his house to protect it when settlers raided the town and hurled stones at houses. Reported information indicated that Israeli settlers climbed up the roof of his house after he shot and beat him up and damage building materials. According to Israeli media, Israeli military said that soldiers shot the man for allegedly attempting to throw a flammable materials. Following the incident, clashes erupted between Palestinians and Israeli settlers backed by Israeli forces. At least 24 Palestinians were injured. Human rights organizations have launched investigations in this case as it remains unclear whether the man was killed by either Israeli force's gunfire or settler's physical assault as the man's body is still withheld by Israeli military.</p>	<p>During clashes between Palestinians and residents of Aish Kodesh, an Arab assailant from the village of Qusra threw an explosive device from one of the rooftops, which detonated upon hitting the ground. The assailant was shot and killed by security forces.</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
5 January 2023	
<p>According to a media report, Israeli settler female was injured lightly in her hand, and damage was caused to two vehicles after Palestinians threw stones at settlers' vehicles travelling near Tuqu' junction, Israeli forces closed all entrances of the village preventing Palestinian access and conducted a search operation . No arrests were reported.</p>	<p>The incident description itself clearly states that this is an incident of Palestinian violence and a normative response by Israeli security forces.</p>

21 January 2023	
<p>A 42-year-old Palestinian man was shot and killed by an Israeli settler on Al Risan Mountain in Kufr Ni'ma village (Ramallah). The full circumstances of the incident is still unclear, while according to the Palestinian man family he was on his way to check his land in the area where the incident took place. Video footage shared in Israeli media shows the Palestinian man near an Israeli settlement outpost trying to run after an Israeli settler who shot and killed him. According to Israeli media the man was trying to stab the Israeli settler. (Ramallah) [Update: The Israeli forces returned on 24 March 2023]</p>	<p>Contrary to the UN's description, the facts were documented in real time by security cameras and are very clear: a Palestinian assailant arrived at Havat Efraim and carried out a stabbing attack against an Israeli who was there. Another Israeli managed to neutralize him and shot him dead. An additional knife was also found on the assailant's body. In other words, the attack ended with the assailant being killed in self-defense.</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
11 February 2023	
<p>One Palestinian man (27 years old) was shot dead after having been targeted by armed Israeli settlers from "Yair Farm" settlement, who opened their gunfire towards a group of Palestinians from the town of Qarawat Bani Hassan, northwest of (Salfit). The deceased man was shot directly by live ammunition in the head from a distance of about 30 meters, killing him almost immediately. Israeli military forces showed up about an hour later (from the killing), firing tear gas canisters, live ammunition, and stun grenades at Palestinians who gathered to protest the killing and the settlers' raid on their town. The incident started when a group of armed settlers (at least 20 people) raided the village and attacked a Palestinian constructing his house by shooting in his direction, minutes before the residents gathered to deter the settlers' attack. No further injuries or property damage were reported. The man was evacuated to the hospital in a private car.</p>	<p>A group consisting of several Israeli families were hiking in the area of Havat Yair when they were attacked by Palestinians throwing stones and shooting fireworks. One of the hikers was lightly injured in the head. In response, one of the Israeli hikers fired at the Palestinians and wounded one of them, who later died from his injuries.</p>

Incident description in UNOCHA database	Factual details of the incident
25 February 2023	
<p>According to Israeli media sources, one Palestinian was injured with live ammunition and arrested by Israeli forces after Palestinians reportedly threw Molotov Cocktails at Israeli settlers' vehicles traveling on road 443 near Beit Sira village (Ramallah). Reportedly, Israeli forces arrived at the scene and arrested one Palestinian after being injured. According to Palestinian local community sources, Israeli settlers fired live ammunition at Palestinians passing on road 443, Israeli forces then arrived at the scene and arrested one of the injured Palestinians. No clashes were reported.</p>	<p>Even according to the description of the incident on the UN website, this was clearly a terror attack in which a Palestinian threw Molotov cocktails at Israeli civilians, yet the case description chooses to portray the attacker as a victim rather than properly classifying the incident as Palestinian violence.</p>

Appendix 4: Additional Cases Reported in Neverland

Fabricated reports

1. On December, 2023, 21 Israel Army Radio reporter Hod Barak appeared on the morning show ¹³³ and on social media ¹³⁴ with a dramatic headline claiming a 54% “surge in nationalist crime incidents by Jews in Judea and Samaria during the first two months of the war compared to the two months prior,” asserting that 201 such incidents occurred during October–November 2023.

However, it quickly became clear that Barak’s data was incorrect. To his credit, he corrected himself about an hour after the original publication ¹³⁵, clarifying that 136 of the 201 incidents—nearly — 70% categorized as “violent confrontation

or stone-throwing,” were in fact cases of mutual violence, where the IDF often cannot determine who actually initiated the event. Barak went further and cited examples of incidents classified as Jewish nationalist crime, which, according to their own descriptions, were actually cases of Palestinian terrorism against Jews and soldiers.” For example, one incident



¹³³ “Editorial: A 54% surge in nationalist crime incidents by Jews in Judea and Samaria: Here’s Why,” ICE 21.12.2023.

¹³⁴ Hod Barak on X, <https://bit.ly/3E0tACL> 21/12/2023; Meirav Arad, “A 54% surge in nationalist crime incidents by Jews in Judea and Samaria,” News1, 21.12.2023.

¹³⁵ Hod Barak on X, 21.12.2023.

that was reported as settler violence turned out to be a clear Palestinian terror attack involving stone-throwing ,assaulting Jews ,and an attempt to snatch a soldier's weapon .Here's the actual report :several Palestinians carried out stone-throwing at two settlers and a reservist soldier near Kisan .In response ,the three exited their vehicle and the reservist fired into the air .Subsequently ,the Palestinians assaulted the civilians ,threw stones at them ,and attempted to seize the reservist's weapon unsuccessfully¹³⁶ .

Another incident turned out to be a Palestinian stone-throwing attack on an IDF unit .In response ,the soldiers opened fire and injured the suspects, who received medical treatment at the medical center in the "settlement" of Tekoa:

"Later ,stones were thrown at a military vehicle in the area .The soldiers disembarked and fired at the suspects .As a result ,three Palestinians were injured — one seriously ,one lightly ,and the third's condition was unknown — and were evacuated via military ambulance to the Tekoa medical center".

2. In December ,2023 an organization called "The Villages Group "claimed that a convoy of about ten civilian vehicles and an ATV left the settlement of Avigayil and" raided the village of Hallet a-Dab'a ,a tiny and remote village that had never had any issues ".They claimed that" for about three hours ,some 50 settlers in IDF uniforms carried out a pogrom in the village, while IDF soldiers protected them ...the rioters entered every home and left complete destruction under the guise of a' search 'beat and humiliated residents who ,as mentioned ,had never been involved in any hostile activity of any kind ".They further claimed" :Settlers in IDF uniforms smashed windows and doors ,broke or confiscated any equipment they found ,including electrical appliances ,expensive tools such as jackhammers and generators .They also entered the village's small school and destroyed everything they could .The settlers and soldiers allegedly stole around NIS 37,000 in cash from several homes ,including some 6,000 Jordanian dinars ,as well as 12 valuable gold coins".

Not only is Hallet a-Dab'a an illegal village established in the heart of Firing Zone 918 in the South Hebron Hills — which the High Court ruled could be evacuated — but an IDF investigation revealed that ,in practice, this was a standard military operation aimed at locating weapons ,which were indeed found .During the operation ,the military force discovered ammunition inside a child's backpack ,military equipment ,and incitement materials .In addition ,one suspect was arrested and transferred for further

136 Hod Barel on X, 21.12.2023.

questioning by the security forces .The IDF further stated" :Following a review ,no incident is known involving the theft of jewelry or the use of violence by soldiers¹³⁷".

3. On Saturday, February 3, 2024, the left-wing organization "Looking the Occupation in the Eye" published the following post, tagging the White House, then-U.S. President Joe Biden, and the International Criminal Court in The Hague: "Events that Smotrich calls antisemitic lies: In Maarjat, southern Jordan Valley, on the holy Sabbath and wearing white shirts, armed settlers descend, raid sheep pens with the aim of stealing and looting the flock of the Palestinian shepherding community — all with the knowledge and protection of the security forces who were informed of the situation. Settler terror is not a campaign; it's a daily reality."¹³⁸ However, after the Sabbath, it became clear this was yet another fabricated story about settler violence. In reality, on Saturday morning, Zohar Sabach, the owner of a farm in the Jordan Valley, was grazing his flock when he encountered dozens of Bedouins walking toward him and circling him. Zohar gathered his sheep and returned to the farm, only to discover several sheep were missing. He called the police and the army, and together they began searching for the missing livestock. The sheep were eventually found in a nearby illegal encampment in Auja al-Fouqa, and their ear tags had been removed. During the search, dozens of Bedouins threw stones at the police and IDF forces, who responded with warning shots. One Bedouin was arrested on suspicion of theft. Throughout the event, anarchists were present, cooperating with the Bedouins, filming what happened, and later crafting the false narrative that was published by radical left-wing organizations and falsely labeled as "settler violence."¹³⁹

137 Hanan Greenwood, "The Lie is exposed: the 'pogrom' by settlers on the Arab village turns out to have been an IDF sweep to locate illegal weapons." Israel Hayom (Hebrew), 11.12.2023.

138 Looking the Occupation in the Eye on X, 3/2/2024.

139 Amichai Shiloh, "Behind the False Campaign on Settler Violence." Hakol HaYehudi, 4.2.2024.



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The Regavim Movement

P.O.B. 44439 Jerusalem 9144302 • Tel.: +972-2-6560303 • Fax: +972-2-6560363

office@regavim.org • www.regavim.org